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ABSTRACT 
 
ERIC GARLAND: Biopsychosocial Assessment of a Mindfulness-Oriented Cognitive 
Intervention for Alcohol Dependent Adults 
(Under the direction of Matthew Howard) 
 
A biopsychosocial approach is needed to comprehend the complex pathogenic 
processes implicated in alcohol dependence. The following three papers employ such an 
approach to explore key research questions: (a) How might stress precipitate alcohol 
misuse, dependence, and relapse, and (b) How can targeted psychosocial interventions 
influence this process? The first paper presents a novel conceptual framework integrating 
formerly discrete theories of stress appraisal, neurobiological allostasis, automatic 
cognitive processing, and addictive behavior to explain how alcohol misuse and 
dependence is maintained and re-activated by stress. This theoretical framework 
underpins the measurement model and intervention that are the focus of the second and 
third papers. The second paper explores relationships between baseline dispositional 
mindfulness and alcohol attentional bias among a sample of recovering alcohol 
dependent adults, relationships that are critical to our argument in support of mindfulness 
training as a treatment for alcohol dependence. The third paper in this series is a report of 
a randomized controlled pilot trial comparing the effects of a mindfulness-oriented 
intervention to those of an alcohol dependence support group. Results from this study 
provide tentative support for the proposed theoretical framework and for the use of 
mindfulness as a treatment for alcohol dependence.
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TARGETING COGNITIVE-AFFECTIVE RISK MECHANISMS IN STRESS-
PRECIPITATED ALCOHOL MISUSE, DEPENDENCE, AND RELAPSE:  
AN INTEGRATED, BIOPSYCHOSOCIAL MODEL OF  
ALLOSTASIS, AUTOMATICITY, AND ADDICTION 
 
ABSTRACT 
This review presents a conceptual integration of formerly discrete theories of 
stress appraisal, neurobiological allostasis, automatic cognitive processing, and addictive 
behavior to explain how alcohol misuse and dependence is maintained and re-activated 
by stress. We outline a risk chain in which psychosocial stress initiates physiological 
arousal, perseverative cognition, and negative affect that in turn triggers automatized 
schema to compel alcohol consumption. This implicit cognitive process then leads to 
attentional biases towards alcohol, subjective experiences of craving, paradoxical 
rebound effects of urge suppression, and palliative coping through drinking. When 
palliative coping relieves distress, it results in negative reinforcement conditioning that 
perpetuates the cycle by further sensitizing the system to future stressful encounters. This 
conceptual framework has implications for development and implementation of 
innovative behavioral interventions such as mindfulness training that may disrupt 
cognitive-affective mechanisms underpinning stress-precipitated dependence on alcohol.
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Alcohol dependence remains prevalent despite a century of intervention efforts. 
Even with apparently efficacious behavioral and pharmacological treatments, relapse 
following treatment is the norm, and long-term recovery rates are low. According to the 
National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC), 28.4% 
of persons ever treated for alcohol problems remain dependent on alcohol and 19.1% 
continue to exhibit alcohol abuse or subclinical dependence symptoms over the past year 
(Dawson, Grant, Stinson et al., 2005); hence, certain risk chains leading to the 
development and maintenance of alcohol dependence may be intractable to extant 
interventions. One such pathway may involve positive feedback loops between stress 
appraisal, emotion dysregulation, physiological arousal, implicit cognition, and palliative 
coping with alcohol. As components of this stress-initiated risk chain may be malleable to 
novel behavioral therapies targeting cognitive-affective mediators of pathogenic gene-
environment interactions, further explication of the pathways underpinning stress-
precipitated alcohol dependence appears warranted.   
The stress reaction appears to be a key mechanism underlying alcohol 
dependence, intensifying alcohol consumption and precipitating relapse; indeed, persons 
who drink alcohol to cope with stress and negative affect exhibit significantly higher 
rates of lifetime and current alcohol dependence symptoms than persons who drink for 
other reasons (Schroder & Perrine, 2007), and increases in stress can precipitate a shift 
towards heavy and more frequent alcohol consumption (Dawson, Grant, & Ruan, 2005). 
Although the causal associations between stress and alcohol dependence have yet to be 
fully specified, clinical experience and empirical research suggest that alcohol is often 
used to “self-medicate” averse cognitive-emotional and psychophysiological sequelae of 
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the stress response (Khantzian, 1997). NESARC data have provided epidemiological data 
on stress and drinking behavior. Among adult past-year drinkers, 72.5% reported 
experiencing at least one stressful life event in the past year, and 23.2% had experienced 
3 to 5 such stressors (Dawson, Grant, & Ruan, 2005). Annual drinkers who reported 
experiencing six or more stressful life events had consumed more than three times the 
amount of daily ethanol and evidenced more than thrice the frequency of heavy drinking 
compared to drinkers who had not experienced life stressors in the past year (Dawson, 
Grant, & Ruan, 2005). Each experience of a past-year stressful life event increased the 
frequency of heavy drinking by 24% for men and 13% for women, and increases in stress 
were associated heavier patterns of alcohol consumption (Dawson, Grant, & Ruan, 2005). 
Congruent with these findings, an event-history analysis of 1786 urban, young adults 
found that both cumulative distal and proximal exposure to stressful life events 
significantly predicted risk of alcohol dependence onset in a linear and additive fashion 
even after controlling for socioeconomic status and history of psychiatric disorder, 
implicating a causal role for life stress in the etiology of alcohol use disorders (Lloyd & 
Turner, 2008). Clearly, life stress is prevalent among alcohol users, and is an important 
predictor of heavy drinking and alcohol dependence. 
The risk chain linking the experience of stress to alcohol dependence may be 
explicated via the integration of transactional stress-coping theory (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984) with the allostatic model of alcohol dependence (Koob, 2003; Koob & Le Moal, 
2001), the cognitive processing model of craving and compulsive alcohol use (Tiffany, 
1990; Tiffany & Conklin, 2000), the affective processing model of negative 
reinforcement (Baker, Piper, McCarthy, Majeskie, & Fiore, 2004), and the second-order 
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cybernetic model of stress, metacognition, and coping (Garland, 2007). According to this 
integrated framework, alcohol dependence involves implicit cognitive operations (Wiers 
et al., 2006; Wiers, Teachman, & De Houwer, 2007) and attentional biases towards 
alcohol-relevant stimuli (Field, 2006) that organize and drive the appetitive, motivational 
states and maladaptive drug-seeking behaviors that characterize this disorder. In brief, 
repeated alcohol misuse establishes automatic alcohol-use action schemas that impel 
continued abuse of the substance through automatized sequences of context-dependent 
behavior (Tiffany, 1990). Nonautomatic inhibition of alcohol-use action plans manifests 
in the subjective experience of craving (Tiffany, 1990, 1999; Tiffany & Conklin, 2000), a 
factor which appears to drive continued alcohol use (de Wit, 2000; Flannery et al., 2001; 
Monti, Rohsenow, & Hutchison, 2000). Psychosocial stress and negative affect evoke 
these automatic and nonautomatic cognitive operations implicated in alcohol dependence 
(Field & Powell, 2007), leading to increased motivation to imbibe alcohol as a means of 
palliative coping (Olff, Langeland, & Gersons, 2005). In turn, such palliative coping 
through alcohol is sustained through negative reinforcement conditioning (Baker, Piper, 
McCarthy, Majeskie, & Fiore, 2004). Continued operation of this self-perpetuating cycle, 
which may be conceptualized as a feedback loop, leads to an ever-deepening dependence 
on alcohol fueled by an increasingly heightened sensitivity to stress, a self-destructive 
pattern that afflicts vulnerable members of society. 
Given the biopsychosocial dimensions of this risk chain, an integrated conceptual 
framework is needed to explicate the causal pathways leading to stress-precipitated 
alcohol misuse, dependence, and relapse. The present manuscript presents a conceptual 
integration of formerly discrete theories of stress appraisal, neurobiological allostasis, 
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automatic cognitive processing, and addictive behavior to explain how alcohol 
dependence is maintained and re-activated by stress. This conceptual framework has 
implications for development and implementation of innovative behavioral interventions 
that disrupt mechanisms underpinning stress-exacerbated dependence on alcohol. 
An Integrated Biopsychosocial Framework of Stress-Precipitated Alcohol Misuse, 
Dependence, and Relapse 
The etiology of alcohol use disorders is complex and multifactorial, involving 
interactions between genetic, environmental, interpersonal, and intrapersonal factors. 
Over time, as alcohol consumption becomes compulsive, automatic appetitive reactions 
begin to supersede controlled, volitional use (Wiers & Stacy, 2006). Once patterns of 
alcohol dependence are established, self-regulatory mechanisms are hijacked by the 
addictive process, and consumption of alcohol is maintained despite willful intent to 
abstain. Even repeated exposure to aversive consequences (e.g., loss of a spouse, 
termination from a job, legal and health problems) may not be enough to discourage the 
alcohol dependent individual from further drinking, and attempts to remain abstinent 
often eventuate in relapse. The question of why alcohol consumption persists in spite of, 
and perhaps, due to, adversity has been the subject of theory and scientific investigation.  
Early motivational theories posited a relation between alcohol consumption and 
stress. The tension reduction hypothesis, originating from animal experiments (Conger, 
1951, 1956), claims that stressful life circumstances motivate alcohol consumption, and 
under such aversive or conflict-laden conditions, alcohol decreases anxiety, which then 
reinforces subsequent alcohol consumption (Cappell & Herman, 1972). Despite its initial 
popularity, this theory lost favor because there was little agreement regarding the 
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conditions under which alcohol dampens the stress response, and some aversive 
conditions actually decrease alcohol consumption (e.g. Caplan & Puglisi, 1986). 
Inconsistent evidence of tension reduction-related drinking motivations in humans has 
been attributed to differences in alcohol expectancies, that is, beliefs about alcohol’s 
supposed ameliorative effect on distress (Young, Oei, & Knight, 1990).   
In an influential paper that demonstrated the stress-response-dampening effects of 
alcohol in humans, Levenson et al. (1980) raised the possibility that cognitive factors 
might mediate the pharmacological effects of alcohol on physiological reactivity. Sons of 
male alcoholics have been shown to exhibit heightened autonomic stress responses that 
are dampened by the effects of alcohol (Pihl, Finn, & Peterson, 1989); such stress-
response dampening has been shown to be highly correlated with executive function 
deficits indicative of prefrontal cortical dysfunction in descendants of alcoholic probands 
(Peterson, Finn, & Pihl, 1992). Pihl, Peterson, and Finn (1990) hypothesized that persons 
who drink alcohol to dampen stress have neurocognitive tendencies towards 
misattributing threatening significance to novel stimuli, resulting in augmented arousal, 
while exhibiting attenuated responses to stimuli that require sustained attention for 
processing. 
The relationship between attentional factors and stress-response-dampening was 
addressed in Steele and Joseph’s attention-allocation model (1988; 1990). This model 
posited that drinking reduces stress via alcohol myopia, that is, a pharmacologically-
induced impairment in controlled cognitive processing coupled with a narrowed 
attentional focus onto immediate internal and external cues. Such myopia is hypothesized 
to reduce capacity for stressful cognition in the face of a demanding task, as well as limit 
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attention to immediately present stimuli rather than future threats. Hence, this model 
predicts that alcohol consumption will result in stress-response-dampening when 
attention to stressors is restricted or divided by task demands, a prediction that has been 
supported by several studies (Curtin, Lang, Patrick, & Stritzke, 1998; Curtin, Patrick, 
Lang, Cacioppo, & Birbaume, 2001; Josephs & Steele, 1990; Steele & Josephs, 1988). 
However, this model has received critical refutation from evidence that suggests that, 
even without attentional manipulations, moderately high doses of alcohol can robustly 
reduce negative emotion (Donohue, Curtin, Patrick, & Lang, 2007). Recent research has 
helped to reconcile this incongruity: using a social stress induction, alcohol was shown to 
exert direct stress-response-dampening effects on heart rate, galvanic skin response, and 
subjective anxiety, but the effects of drinking on stress-induced skin conductance 
responses were partially mediated by differences on a sustained attention task (Sher, 
Bartholow, Peuser, Erickson, & Wood, 2007). Because drinking appears to exert effects 
on stress reactivity through its influence on attention, attentional mechanisms and related 
cognitive processes may be an important link in the association between stress and 
alcohol consumption. 
Building on such earlier work, we argue that alcohol dependence is maintained, in 
part, by automatic and implicit cognitive processes which subvert and bypass the 
conscious desire to abstain from alcohol. Stress and negative affect play a large role in 
activating the appetitive automaticity and attentional biases underpinning alcohol 
dependence maintenance and relapse. The proposed conceptual framework of risk 
mechanisms implicated in stress-precipitated maintenance of and relapse to alcohol 
dependence integrates a transactional stress-coping model (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; 
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Olff et al., 2005) with an allostatic model of alcohol dependence (Koob, 2003; Koob & 
Le Moal, 2001), a cognitive processing model of craving and compulsive alcohol use 
(Tiffany, 1990; Tiffany & Conklin, 2000), and an affective processing model of negative 
reinforcement (Baker et al., 2004). This integrated framework, which builds upon a 
conceptual model of stress, metacognition, and coping (Garland, 2007), describes a 
cybernetic, informational circuit; as such, the causal flow loops back upon itself, with the 
output of the circuit (i.e., relapse) becoming its own input (i.e. a stressor) in further 
iterations of the cycle. Figure 1 (below) depicts this circuit, which is then detailed in the 
text that follows. 
Figure 1. An integrated, biopsychosocial framework of stress-precipitated alcohol 
misuse, dependence, and relapse 
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Stress and cognitive appraisal activate the risk chain. Though some models of 
stress and addiction treat stress exposure as a monolithic concept, stress is a 
multicomponent process modulated by biopsychosocial factors. Among the numerous 
factors that influence the stress process, cognitive appraisal may be viewed as a central 
governor of the system. Although the stress concept derived from the physical sciences, 
biological organisms subjected to stressors are quite unlike inorganic objects which 
deform predictably and systematically under the external force of a load. Organisms 
actively construct their phenomenological experiences by coupling with the medium of 
the environment according to their own self-organizing structure (Maturana & Varela, 
1987; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991); in other words, an animal with “a nervous 
system perceives the world according to its own linkages and activities, not as a readout 
of some objective reality” (Lewis, 2001). Thus, humans encounter environmental stimuli 
and interpret the meaning of events and situations of their lives according to their 
perceived relevance to self and others, a perception which is shaped by the historical, 
sociocultural, and environmental context in which the individual is embedded. 
This self-organizing interpretive or evaluative process, known as appraisal, may 
fundamentally modulate the physiological stimulus-response relationship, allowing for 
substantial behavioral variation in the organism’s adaptation to the environment. Indeed, 
although an extensive range of diverse stimuli may activate the common set of cortical, 
sub-cortical, neuroendocrine, and autonomic systems involved in the stress response, 
appraisal accounts for qualitative and quantitative differences in stress reactivity within 
and between individuals (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Exposed to the same stressor, one 
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individual may respond with depression and helpless apathy, another with violence and 
rage, and a third with optimism and constructive, prosocial action.  
A wide array of life events may initiate the stress process.  Compared to the 
environment of our ancestors where the scenario of fleeing from a wild beast was more 
commonplace, the usual context of most industrial and information-age societies less 
frequently presents humans with immediately life-threatening stressors. On the other 
hand, there are still many countries today where violence and death are encountered 
frequently due to war, crime, or famine. Nevertheless, we more often face stress from our 
attribution of symbolic meaning to psychosocial events deemed relevant to well-being 
(Rosmond, 2005). Persons from the middle- and upper-classes are threatened by possible 
loss of financial security, marital strife, and the downsizing of companies. In contrast, 
persons from the marginalized strata of society experience insidious, pervasive, constant 
stress in the form of deprivation, discrimination, and intimidation. Among persons 
confronted with the inequities of poverty and oppression, who already face chronic, 
environmental stress from the load of multiple economic, health, and social disparities, 
stressors such as the loss of a job present a very real danger that may initiate sequelae 
deleterious to mind and body. 
Modern society places demands upon the individual that require one to cope with 
often high levels of stress. In the face of war, economic recession, and ecological crisis, 
individuals and communities bear the brunt of societal and global catastrophes, 
compounded by the daily hassles of living. Vulnerable populations who are less able to 
cope due to a lack of social, economic, or cognitive-emotional resources evidence the 
adverse consequences of stress through mental and physical illness. Hence, stress-
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induced pathology presents a serious problem for a society increasingly subjected to both 
global and local strains, especially so for its most vulnerable members. 
Just as stress aggravates other forms of pathology, psychosocial stressors may 
exacerbate alcohol misuse. Individuals who experience social, legal, or work-related 
stressors report significantly more frequent heavy drinking days than those who do not 
face such stressors (Dawson, Grant, & Ruan, 2005). Given the association between stress 
and heavy drinking and the higher prevalence of social, legal, and job-related stressors 
among poor persons, it follows that poverty is a significant correlate of higher levels of 
alcohol consumption (Dawson, Grant, & Ruan, 2005). Indeed, past-year prevalence of 
alcohol dependence was highest among persons making less than $20,000 a year in 2002, 
and the odds of meeting criteria for alcohol dependence in the past year and over one’s 
lifetime are greatest for those with lower incomes (Hasin et al., 2007). Additionally, 
among poor persons, job-related stress was found to increase alcohol consumption 
quantity and frequency (Dawson, Grant, & Ruan, 2005). These findings echo those from 
a study conducted nearly two decades ago: among a sample of 501 problem drinkers who 
had been recruited at two large medical centers, problem drinkers reported having 
significantly more financial and neighborhood-related stressors and significantly fewer 
financial resources than non-problem drinkers, and financial stress was a significant 
predictor of drinking problems (Brennan & Moos, 1990). On the other hand, heavy 
drinking may impede social and occupational functioning, leading to socioeconomic 
disadvantage. Although survey research cannot rule out the possibility of reciprocal 
causation, it appears as if socioeconomic forces exert strain upon individuals that may 
result in stress-precipitated alcohol consumption. 
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Whether confronted by psychosocial or physical stressors, the stress process 
initiates with a primary appraisal of stimuli for risk value. When a given stimulus is 
cognitively appraised as challenging, harmful, or threatening, an activation of 
physiological systems involved in the stress response co-occurs with the subjective 
experience of distress (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Subsequently, a cognitive process of 
secondary appraisal determines the sufficiency of available resources and coping options 
to meet the demands of the actual or potential harm. Appraisals may be automatic, 
executed without intention and performed without conscious deliberation (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999); for example, meta-analysis has shown that predictions about the intent 
and future behaviors of others are typically made in less than 30 seconds (Ambady & 
Rosenthal, 1992). Such rapid and unconscious appraisals may utilize hardwired reflexes, 
nondeclarative memory, and implicit cognitive operations, in contrast to intentional 
appraisal processes that rely upon declarative memory and propositional reasoning 
(Ellsworth & Scherer, 2002; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). Implicit appraisals of 
threatening stimuli (e.g., angry facial expressions, loud sounds that might herald the 
approach of a predator, poisonous animals such as snakes and spiders) facilitate survival 
and thus may have been naturally selected for during human evolution (Ohman & Wiens, 
2002).   
From a biological perspective, appraisal may involve relaying visual, auditory, 
and somatic information about a stimulus from the thalamus to sensory processing areas 
of the cortex, activating affective processing circuits involving the amygdala, medial 
temporal lobe, and medial prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortices (LeDoux, 2002). This 
neural circuitry appears to compute the hedonic or threat value of the stimulus according 
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to previously established stimulus-reinforcement contingencies. For example, based on 
past experiences (e.g., previous encounters with strangers), a stimulus (e.g., facial 
expression of a passer-by on the street) is judged to be threatening, innocuous, or even 
rewarding. This computation may be modulated by prefrontal-amygdala circuits 
involving the anterior cingulate, prelimbic, and medial prefrontal cortices, which appear 
to temper and regulate stress reactivity through cognitive processing. In addition, inputs 
from the hippocampus may provide the amygdala with information about the stimulus 
context, allowing for differentiation between stimuli that in one context would be 
appraised as benign and in another, as dangerous. Stress appraisals discriminating 
threatening from benign stimuli (e.g., snakes from flowers) can be made within as few as 
50 milliseconds (Ohman & Wiens, 2002). Backwards masking experiments, involving 
brief presentation of a target stimulus immediately followed by a mask of random noise, 
show threat appraisals can occur completely without consciousness via implicitly 
conditioned, subcortical thalamic-amygdala pathways (LeDoux, 2002; Ohman, 2005; 
Ohman, Carlsson, Lundqvist, & Ingvar, 2007) 
Triggered by such appraisals, the stress reaction is instantiated through spreading 
neural activity from the amygdala to the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, the 
locus coeruleus, and the autonomic nervous system. Stimulus-evoked activation of this 
neural circuitry regulates physiological parameters through the multifarious feedforward 
and feedback processes of allostasis. Perception of threat triggers a neuroendocrine 
cascade from HPA axis, initiated by the central amygdala signaling the paraventricular 
nucleus of the hypothalamus to release corticotrophin-releasing hormone (CRH), 
stimulating the pituitary to secrete adrenocorticotropin (ACTH), beta-endorphin, and 
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other peptides which in turn trigger release of cortisol from the adrenal cortex (Brosschot, 
Gerin, & Thayer, 2006; Kaye & Lightman, 2005). Cortisol exerts effects on nearly every 
cell of the body to redirect regulatory processes to meet the perceived challenge; these 
changes include mobilizing cellular energy resources via induction of liver enzymes, 
decreasing digestion, modulating the trafficking of immune cells, and influencing 
inflammatory processes through cytokine production (Chrousos & Gold, 1992; Kudielka 
& Kirschbaum, 2007). Cortisol also facilitates the encoding of fear-based memories by 
influencing neurotransmission between the amygdala and hippocampus (McEwen, 2007). 
Such hormonal regulation is comparatively slow, occurring over periods of several 
minutes, hours, or days (Janig, 2002). 
In addition to these slower hormonal responses, stress appraisal activates the locus 
coeruleus (LC) in the brainstem to release the catecholamines nonadrenaline and 
adrenaline, which increase heart rate, blood pressure, and blood flow to skeletal muscles 
and the brain during the “fight-or-flight response” (Cannon, 1929; Chrousos & Gold, 
1992). This stress-evoked survival response is also mediated through the rapid response 
(occurring within seconds) of sympathetic and parasympathetic neurons of the autonomic 
nervous system, consisting of reciprocally interconnected neural circuits between 
prefrontal cortex, amygdala, brainstem, viscera, and periphery that innervate muscle 
groups, drive and modulate the pacemaker of the heart, effect gastric contractions, 
stimulate sweat gland activity, and regulate shifts in body temperature (Janig, 2002). 
Under typical conditions, this system is tonically inhibited by prefrontal cortical regions 
such as anterior cingulate, orbitofrontal, ventromedial, and insular cortices, but is 
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disinhibited during threat perception to mobilize the body into defensive action (Thayer 
& Ruiz-Padial, 2006). 
If, during this complex cognitive process of appraisal, available resources (e.g., 
individual, familial, or communal) are deemed insufficient to address the challenge 
presented by the threatening stimulus, then biopsychosocial consequences of stress may 
result. Prolonged or repeated stress activation may lead to an allostatic state, a chronic 
deviation of self-regulatory mechanisms from their normal mode of operation that leads 
to heightened sensitivity to threat and vulnerability to future stressors (McEwen, 1998). 
Among allostatic mechanisms at work is a feed-forward cycle between the amygdala and 
the HPA axis, whereby amygdala-triggered release of cortisol from the adrenals impairs 
hippocampal function while sensitizing the amygdala, leading to greater cortisol release 
during repeated exposures to the stressor (LeDoux, 2002; McEwen, 2007; Neville, Stutz, 
Lee, Davis, & Rosbash, 1997). Release of stress hormones also impairs function of the 
prefrontal cortex, which inhibits successful emotion regulation and heightens future stress 
reactivity (Arnsten, 1998; Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic, 1998). This state of hyperarousal 
results in allostatic load, a “wear and tear” on the body involving consequences such as 
include hippocampal atrophy (McEwen, 2003; 2007), as well as neuroendocrine 
(McEwen, 2007) and cardiovascular (Brosschot, Pieper, & Thayer, 2005; McEwen, 
2006) dysregulation. Deleterious effects of stress can be moderated by effective coping. 
The appraisal process is dynamic and mutable; new data from the changing environment 
coupled with information about the effect of one’s behavioral responses to the threat may 
initiate a reappraisal, in which the original evaluation is changed as a result of feedback. 
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Problem- and emotion-focused coping ameliorate stress. Once an event is 
appraised as stressful, the individual may utilize problem- and emotional-focused coping 
efforts to deal with the stressor. Problem-focused coping consists of strategic attempts to 
manage or resolve the stressful event by gathering information, making decisions, and 
resolving conflict. Positive emotion can be generated when, as a result of successful 
coping efforts, the stressor event is resolved favorably; however, biopsychosocial distress 
intensifies when coping attempts are unsuccessful and the stressor is not resolved 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Lack of a favorable resolution may lead to deployment of 
emotion-focused coping efforts to manage the distress itself (e.g., positive reappraisal, a 
cognitive-affective regulatory strategy of re-interpreting the stressor event as benign or 
meaningful) (Folkman, 1997). Positive reappraisal, which appears to engage the 
prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate to inhibit activation of the amygdala (Ochsner & 
Gross, 2005), is thought to attenuate negative emotions via the re-construal of the stressor 
event as meaningful and growth-promoting (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000).  
Positive reappraisal is an active coping strategy (Folkman, 1997), rather than a 
defense mechanism used to repress or deny. Unlike suppression of negative emotions 
which can cause increased sympathetic nervous system activation (Gross & Levenson, 
1997), positive reappraisal does not typically lead to physiological or psychosocial 
complications (Gross, 2002; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002). In addition, 
positive reappraisal is often the first step toward a reengagement with the stressor event. 
For instance, a person stricken with a non-fatal heart attack might positively reappraise 
the event as an opportunity to change their lifestyle and subsequently begin to make 
changes in diet and exercise behaviors. Alternatively, a person who has recovered from 
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cancer might view their survival of the disease as evidence of their strength and 
resilience, and they might decide to dedicate their life to helping others make similar 
recoveries. Hence, positive reappraisal is often an adaptive rather than an avoidant 
strategy. However, in the absence of adaptive coping, stress leads to perseveration. 
Perseverative cognition exacerbates stress. The stress response often results in 
perseverative cognition, a maladaptive process of fruitlessly maintaining a cognitive 
representation of the stressor in the absence of implementing adaptive coping behaviors 
(Brosschot et al., 2006). Such perseveration may involve activation of working memory 
circuits including the prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, and extended amygdala, whereby 
computations about present environmental stimulus contingencies are colored by past 
aversively conditioned relations stored in explicit memory systems (LeDoux, 2002). 
Regions in prefrontal cortex that appear to provide top-down governance of the amygdala 
during stress appraisal may become impaired during anxiety states, leading to amplified 
threat perception (Rauch, Shin, & Wright, 2003). Perseverative cognitive styles such as 
catastrophizing, the exaggeration of the threat value of a stimulus, or rumination, the 
experience of repetitive, intrusive negative thoughts about an event, result in runaway 
positive feedback loops between cognitive stress-appraisal processes, negative affect, and 
sustained activation of both the autonomic nervous system and its visceral efferents. 
Protracted activation of this pathway disrupts homeostasis of body systems through 
cortisol- and catecholamine- mediated stress-responses (Thayer & Brosschot, 2005)., In 
the case of an alcohol dependent individual early in the process of recovery, this 
activation compound the physiological distress of conditions such as alcohol withdrawal.  
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Stress primes impulsive alcohol consumption via allostasis. Allostatic load from 
chronic, cognitively-driven, negative affective states may dysregulate stress and reward 
neurocircuitry within the extended amygdala, moving the brain reward set point from its 
normal level, resulting in decreased sensitivity to reward and increased sensitivity to 
punishment or aversive states (Koob & Le Moal, 2001).  Stress-induced dysregulation of 
hedonic processing may be particularly pernicious among alcohol dependent individuals, 
who tend to favor immediate gratification and discount delayed rewards. This cognitive 
process of impulsive decision-making may be mediated by alterations in HPA-axis 
functioning (Mitchell, Fields, D'Esposito, & Boettiger, 2005), increased activation in 
posterior parietal cortex, dorsal prefrontal cortex, and parahippocampal gyrus regions 
(Boettiger et al., 2007), or a combination of decreased activity and structural 
abnormalities in orbitofrontal cortex (Dom, Sabbe, Hulstijn, & van den Brink, 2005). 
Given their tendency toward impulsivity exacerbated by a possible neurobiological shift 
of the reward set point, recovering alcohol dependent individuals under stress may turn to 
alcohol consumption to achieve hedonic allostasis (Koob, 2003) despite of potential 
future consequences of use. In this case, the impulse to drink may be subserved by 
automatic cognitive processes. 
Automatic alcohol use schemata regulate addictive behavior. Perseverative 
cognition induces intense affective experiences of worry and dysphoria that may evoke 
alcohol use action schema, automatized, associative networks within which are encoded 
information for the nonvolitional execution of alcohol-use behaviors (Tiffany, 1990). 
Frequent drinking in response to stressors initially leads to the formation of behavior-
outcome associations (Elsner & Hommel, 2001) as the palliative effects of alcohol 
19 
 
negatively reinforce drinking behaviors. At first such stress-precipitated drinking may 
stem from explicit expectancies that alcohol will provide relief from stress (Cooper, 
Frone, Russell, & Mudar, 1995; Stewart, Hall, Wilkie, & Birch, 2002) based on past 
experience of the rewarding and hedonic effects of alcohol. Over time, repeated drinking 
under stressful circumstances can lead to stimulus-response habits which may not be 
affected by aversive consequences. For example, among rats, self-administration of 
alcohol is rendered undeterred or insensitive to conditioned aversion (e.g. illness due to 
alcohol being contaminated with lithium chloride) (Dickinson, Wood, & Smith, 2002). 
This finding from basic science parallels observations of intractable drinking in the face 
of severe, stress-inducing consequences such as loss of a spouse or job. 
Such schemata may arise out of a history of repeated alcohol consumption in 
much the same way that other overlearned behavioral repertoires become automatized. 
Stimulus-response habits are formed through repetition. After hundreds of repetitions of 
consistent responses to a given stimulus, attending and responding to that stimulus 
becomes automatic, leading to rapid processing in neural circuits involved in response 
execution (Chein & Schneider, 2005; Schneider & Chein, 2003). Automaticity requires 
the consistent training of associations without varying stimulus-response relationships 
(Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). During formation of automatic 
habits, a neurobiological shift occurs in which behaviors that were originally guided by 
associative networks involving prefrontal cortical regions become controlled by 
sensorimotor cortico-basal ganglia networks (Yin & Knowlton, 2006). Addictive 
consumption of alcohol appears to derive, in part, from an automatized stimulus-response 
habit. 
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Automaticity underlying compulsive drinking may be compounded by changes in 
brain reward circuits caused by repeated alcohol consumption, dopaminergic 
neuroadaptations in the nucleus accumbens and ventral striatum that appear to result in 
sensitization to the rewarding effects of alcohol and alcohol-related cues (Robinson & 
Berridge, 1993, 2000, 2008).  Such heightened incentive salience may impart 
compulsivity to alcohol-seeking behaviors, motivating the alcohol dependent person to 
drink despite countervailing reasons to remain abstinent (Robinson & Berridge, 2003). 
Thus, cues such as the sight of a bar, an advertisement in a magazine, or a familiar 
“drinking buddy” can reflexively trigger the desire to consume alcohol, long after one has 
gone through withdrawal and even after extended periods of abstinence. Once alcohol has 
been obtained, it may be consumed automatically, guided by implicit cognitive schemata. 
Alcohol use action schemata may be subserved by neural circuits between the 
dorsal cingulate cortex, hippocampus, amygdala, striatum, and nucleus accumbens where 
conditioning and context-encoding neural projections motivate appetitive behavior 
(Everitt & Robbins, 2005). The rapid, automatic processing of addiction-related stimuli 
(including negative affective states and environmental-contextual stimulus 
configurations) via implicit schema may trigger conditioned appetitive and behavioral 
responses without deployment of conscious decision-making processes. Hence, the 
alcohol dependent person may find him or herself consuming alcohol without 
consciousness of the motive or intent to drink, in much the same way as other complex 
thought-action repertoires such as goal-pursuit can be engaged without conscious volition 
by conditioned contextual cues (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). 
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Automatic cognitive processes appear to exert a signifcant influence on drinking. 
Indeed, implicit memory associations of alcohol with positive outcomes (e.g., providing 
relief from stress) are among the strongest predictors of future drinking behavior, even 
after controlling for lifetime alcohol use, explicit alcohol expectancies, and 
sociodemographic and personality variables (Stacy, 1997). Automatic alcohol approach 
associations were correlated with urge to drink after exposure to alcohol (Palfai & 
Ostafin, 2003).  In contrast to problem drinkers who reported low levels of psychiatric 
distress, among problem drinkers high in psychiatric distress, negative affective words 
primed responses (i.e., speeded reaction times) to alcohol words (Zack, Toneatto, & 
MacLeod, 1999). Using the addiction Stroop task, Stewart and colleagues found that 
persons who drank alcohol to cope with stress exhibited priming effects to negative mood 
cues on alcohol words (Stewart et al., 2002). 
The initiation of alcohol use action schema may be indexed by the addiction-
Stroop paradigm, which, like the emotional Stroop paradigm used with affectively salient 
stimuli, is thought to index activation of automatic cognitive operations (Algom, Chajut, 
& Lev, 2004). The addiction-Stroop is an adaptation of the classic Stroop task wherein 
participants are tasked to identify the color of alcohol-related and neutral words; meta-
analysis of 17 studies evidenced that relative to controls, alcohol dependent, alcohol 
abusing, and heavy-drinking individuals are slower to name the color of alcohol-related 
words than neutral words (Cox, Fadardi, & Pothos, 2006). For example, in the study with 
the strongest effect size (d = 2.07), 128 subjects comprised of 64 persons undergoing 
outpatient alcohol treatment and 64 controls participated in an alcohol Stroop task 
(Lusher, Chandler, & Ball, 2004). Relative to controls, alcoholics have significantly 
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slower color-naming responses to alcohol-related words. This finding suggests that 
alcohol-related stimuli may be automatically processed by persons with alcohol use 
disorders. However, slowed reaction times to alcohol cues on the addiction Stroop task 
may alternately index exogenous engagement of attention, capture of cognitive resources, 
or elicitation of subjective craving; all three processes may result in cognitive load which 
may impede goal-directed behavior (Field & Cox, 2008). Whether such disruption of 
cognitive resources contributes to alcoholics’ self-reported difficulty in using coping 
skills to resist alcohol cravings remains the subject of future empirical tests. 
Alcohol attentional bias is linked to craving. Engagement of alcohol use action 
schemata may result in automatic processing of salient stimuli, manifested as an 
involuntary attentional bias towards alcohol cues. On visual probe tasks, heavy drinkers 
compared to light social drinkers preferentially attend to alcohol-relevant stimuli, 
evidencing decreased reaction times to probes replacing alcohol photographs relative to 
those replacing neutral photos (Field et al., 2007; Field & Eastwood, 2005; Field, Mogg, 
& Bradley, 2005; Field et al., 2004). In heavy drinkers, this bias occurs for alcohol cues 
presented for durations of 500 ms and 2000 ms, and not for stimuli presented only for 
200 ms (Field et al., 2004). By contrast, abstinent alcohol abusers evidenced an 
attentional bias for alcohol-related photos presented for 50 ms, but showed no bias for 
photos presented for 500 ms (Noel et al., 2006). For comparison, on alcohol-unrelated 
perceptual tasks, participants typically require 50 ms to shift attention to a visual cue 
(Duncan, Ward, & Shapiro, 1994), while requiring 150 ms to disengage attention from 
one cue and shift it to another location in space (Theeuwes, 2005). Hence, alcohol 
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attentional biases may be measured during maintenance/disengagement of attention as 
well as during initial orienting processes. 
Alcohol attentional bias is robustly and positively correlated with craving (Field, 
Mogg, & Bradley, 2005; Field, Mogg, Zetteler, & Bradley, 2004; Field & Powell, 2007). 
The relation between alcohol attentional biases and subjective craving may be causal; 
persons trained to attend to alcohol cues for 500 ms with a modified visual probe task 
experienced increased cravings and consumed significantly more beer compared to 
persons trained to attend to neutral stimuli (Field & Eastwood, 2005). Thus, it appears to 
be attentional hold rather than attentional orienting to alcohol cues that seems to 
influence alcohol seeking behaviors in heavy drinkers. Although the processes by which 
addiction-related attentional biases influence alcohol dependence have not been 
adequately detailed, it is evident that subjective urges to drink and drinking behavior 
itself are modulated by attention. Among persons who drink alcohol to cope, stress 
intensifies alcohol attentional bias and concomitant experience of craving (Field & 
Powell, 2007).  
Across several studies, attentional bias appears to be proportional to the frequency 
and quantity of alcohol consumed by drinkers (Field & Cox, 2008). Additionally, alcohol 
attentional bias as measured by the addiction Stroop task predicted relapse in alcohol 
abusers (Cox, Hogan, Kristian, & Race, 2002) and alcohol consumption at a 6-month 
follow-up (Cox, Pothos, & Hosier, 2007). Due to ambiguity in interpreting results from 
the addiction Stroop task, it is unclear how to account for this predictive relationship. 
Nevertheless, whether through the invocation of automatic, conditioned responses, 
preferential attending to alcohol cues, or diversion of cognitive resources away from 
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maintenance of normal daily activity and thought processes, alcohol-related attentional 
biases may foster addictive behavior and impede recovery in alcohol dependent persons. 
Craving results in dysphoria and autonomic arousal. There appears to be a 
positive feedback loop between alcohol attentional biases and the experience of craving, 
such that preferential attending to alcohol cues drives craving, which then magnifies the 
attentional bias (Field & Powell, 2007).  Craving itself is a multiplex phenomenon, 
involving cognitive processes, negative affect, neurobiological circuits involved in 
withdrawal and reward, contextual learning, and socially-driven alcohol expectancies. 
Theorists debate whether craving is the subjective correlate of classically conditioned 
alcohol withdrawal (A. M. Ludwig & Wikler, 1974), the cognitive interpretation of 
alcohol cue-related physiological arousal (Melchior & Tabakoff, 1984), the expectation 
or anticipation of the rewarding effects of alcohol (Marlatt, 1985), or the cognitive, 
affective, and physiological reactivity resulting from impeded automatized alcohol-use 
sequences (Tiffany, 1990). According to Tiffany (1999), alcohol dependent persons in 
recovery experience craving when they attempt to block or inhibit an automatic impulse 
to consume alcohol triggered by external (e.g., the sight of one’s favorite drink) or 
internal (e.g., an emotional state) cues. 
Given that prefrontal cortical areas such as the orbitofrontal cortex and anterior 
cingulate are implicated in cognitive control and volitional inhibition of urge impulses 
(Knoch & Fehr, 2007), cognitive processing models of craving (Tiffany & Conklin, 
2000) would predict increased activity in these brain regions when alcohol dependent 
individuals attempt to abstain from drinking in the face of alcohol cues. In fact, craving 
has been associated with increased activity in orbitofrontal cortex (Dom et al., 2005; 
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Kalivas & Volkow, 2005; Risinger et al., 2005), while the attempt to inhibit addictive 
urges has also been shown to evoke anterior cingulate activity (Brody et al., 2007). This 
finding supports the notion that heightened activation of prefrontal cortex in abstinent 
alcohol dependent persons during exposure to alcohol-related stimuli (Park et al., 2007) 
may stem in part from inhibition of craving-related neural activity in the ventral striatum 
(Heinz et al., 2004). Craving also correlates with metabolic increases in dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex and the amygdala, suggesting that addictive urges are subserved by 
activation of integrated cognitive-emotional memory circuits (S. Grant et al., 1996). A 
cascade of autonomic responses co-occur with subjective craving, including decreased 
heart-rate variability and increased salivation (Ingjaldsson et al., 2003), as well increased 
blood pressure and salivary cortisol levels (Fox, Bergquist, Hong, & Sinha, 2007).  
Nearly two decades ago, Tiffany (1990) astutely recognized the inherent difficulty 
in teasing apart physiological correlates associated with activation of automatized alcohol 
use schema from those associated with withdrawal and the nonautomatic cognitive 
processes concomitant with craving; this constellation of physiological responses is a 
relatively-undifferentiated aggregate of generalized autonomic arousal that co-occurs 
with the dysphoria of craving. 
Suppressing the urge to drink intensifies craving and alcohol-related cognitions. 
In response to the disturbing thoughts and feelings that accompany craving, alcohol 
dependent persons in recovery may attempt to suppress the urge to drink as a expression 
of “willpower” (Bateson, 1971). Unwittingly, such efforts may only serve to enhance the 
availability of alcohol-related cognitions and affective reactions to consciousness, as a 
body of research indicates that attempted suppression often results in an increased rate of 
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the very thoughts and moods it is directed against, as well as heightened 
psychophysiological reactivity (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987; Wegner & 
Zanakos, 1994; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). Heavy drinkers exhibited faster reaction 
times to alcohol expectancy items than control phrases after having been asked to 
suppress drinking urges subsequent to visual and olfactory alcohol cue-exposure (Palfai, 
Monti, Colby, & Rohsenow, 1997). Among alcoholics presented with an imaginal 
alcohol exposure script, thought suppression was inversely associated with tonic heart 
rate variability, indicative of impaired inhibitory control of perseverative cognition 
(Ingjaldsson, Laberg, & Thayer, 2003). Hence, it appears as if the attempt to suppress the 
urge to drink paradoxically increases the autonomic arousal and intrusive alcohol-related 
cognitions characteristic of craving, resulting in magnified distress and enhanced drive to 
drink alcohol.  
Palliative coping through alcohol consumption is negatively reinforcing. For 
negative affect subtypes of alcohol dependence, alcohol consumption may be an attempt 
to allay the autonomic distress and negative affective states that co-occur with stress and 
craving. In this light, alcohol use is a form of palliative coping (Olff et al., 2005). This 
alcohol-mediated coping response may be twofold in nature: via anxiolytic depressant 
effects that reduce sympathetic arousal (Stritzke, Lang, & Patrick, 1996), and via acutely 
rewarding effects that compensate for dysphoric emotions via endogenous opioid release 
and dopamine release (Kalivas & Volkow, 2005). Although the opioid and dopamingeric 
effects of alcohol consumption are positively reinforcing, alcohol’s 
psychopharmacological reduction of negative affect is theorized to exert negative 
reinforcement conditioning (Baker et al., 2004). Through both forms of reinforcement, 
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alcohol consumption may become a conditioned response to endogenously-generated 
negative affect and exogenously encountered stressor stimuli.  
When the addictive process is established, withdrawal from alcohol generates 
negative emotions and physiological distress, motivating the addict to imbibe more 
alcohol to relieve the discomfort. Ultimately, the negative reinforcement obtained from 
such palliative coping efforts augments associative networks between stress, 
perseverative cognition, negative affect, and alcohol use action schemata, such that when 
reactivated by subsequent stressors, these cognitive-affective stimulus configurations 
initiate and guide ensembles of automatized alcohol consumption behaviors. This pattern 
drives relapse into a self-destructive, downward spiral fueled by an increasing sensitivity 
and vulnerability to stressful life events. 
Conclusion 
Stress appraisals coupled with perceived lack of problem-solving resources result 
in neurophysiological arousal, perseverative cognition, and negative affect. This 
reactivity may in turn trigger automatized schemata to deploy sequences of maladaptive 
cognitive-behavioral processes, including attentional biases towards affectively-charged 
stimuli, the urge to alleviate distress, and palliative coping attempts to avoid the stressor 
or allay its impact through impulsive behavior. When palliative coping relieves distress, it 
results in negative reinforcement conditioning that perpetuates the cycle by further 
sensitizing the system to future stressful encounters.  
Hypothetically, this stress-initiated risk chain may undergird multiple forms of 
psychopathological self-regulation failure, ranging from the various forms of alcohol and 
drug dependence to sex and gambling addiction, obsessive-compulsive disorder, eating 
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disorders, and mood disorders. These diverse conditions appear to share a common 
structure of stress-precipitated, automatic allostasis, where dysfunctional attempts to self-
regulate in response to stressors perpetuate a system of runaway positive feedback loops 
that result in continued dysregulation. Whether an individual becomes adapted to 
exogenously obtained chemicals or those generated within the nervous system during a 
particular mood, in either case that individual acclimates to a particular state of the mileu 
interior, and thereby becomes entrenched in a self-perpetuating cycle.   
Thus, stress-precipitated addiction is a form of adaptation, a learning process 
whereby a number of interlocking variables are maximized, resulting in runaway growth 
of the system and the disruption of homeostasis. The essential systemic dependency of 
organism and environment, involving the organismic relationship to food, water, air, and 
other basic units of survival, is disrupted via the acquisition of a new dependency (i.e., 
the dependence on drugs or alcohol). This acquisition involves a systemic change, an 
acclimation of the system to a new functional state. However, in the escalating 
symmetrical process of stress-precipitated addiction, the adaptation of the system does 
not solve but instead exacerbates the perceived problem, resulting in a positive feedback 
loop of increased addictive behavior, leading to a runaway state. The intake of the 
psychoactive substance “resets the bias - changes the structure,” leading to a recalibration 
of the system into an allostatic mode (Bateson & Bateson, 1987, p. 314). 
In this sense, addiction may be seen as a self-organizing system, operating to 
maximize and maintain its own organization without assistance from an external 
regulator (Bickel & Potenza, 2006). Like other self-organizing or autopoeitic systems, 
stress-precipitated addiction is a multivariate process whose components (neurobiological 
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and sociocognitive) dynamically interact to produce and preserve its internal coherence. 
Out of this dynamic interaction arises the emergent phenomenon of addiction itself: that 
is, the self-maintaining, continually recalibrating process relayed in the proverb: “first the 
man takes a drink, then the drink takes the drink, then the drink takes the man” (Ludwig, 
1988). Self-organizing systems maintain homeostasis through overarching negative 
feedback processes, and hence, only change as a result of perturbation from an outside 
source (Bateson, 1972; Bickel & Potenza, 2006). If the calamitous social, occupational, 
and health consequences of “hitting bottom” are of sufficient intensity, they may serve to 
perturb the otherwise stable, self-perpetuating system of addiction, eventuating in the 
dissolution of the autopoeitic unity of the addictive system. Similarly, if therapies target 
critical links of the risk chain, the resultant perturbation of the addictive system may lead 
to an adaptive reconfiguration. Whether precipitated by hitting bottom or fostered 
through treatment, the disassembly of behavioral routines, cognitive processes, and 
physiological responses underpinning addiction may ultimately lead to the shift towards 
sobriety.  
The integrated biopsychosocial model of stress-precipitated alcohol dependence 
has implications for targeted forms of treatment, guiding the design of interventions that 
may disrupt the risk chain at multiple points. Therapies can be aimed at initial stress 
appraisal processes, leading to more accurate perception of situational demands and valid 
self-efficacy estimations. Clarified appraisals may attenuate subsequent stress reactions, 
interrupting preservative cognitive processes like catastrophizing and rumination, thereby 
preventing or lessening stress-precipitated alcohol consumption. Similarly, interventions 
could reduce the psychophysiological arousal and negative affective states triggered by 
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stress appraisal. By inducing a parasympathetic “relaxation response,” stress-precipitated 
activation of the nervous system can be countered, preventing elicitation of downstream 
addictive processes. Emotion regulation through affect labeling, attentional refocusing, 
cognitive reappraisal, or metacognitive decentering from affectively-charged stimulus 
evaluations can attenuate the influence of emotionally-distressing stimuli on 
biobehavioral responses (Ochsner & Gross, 2005, 2008). These forms of self-regulatory 
cognitive control mechanisms can be developed over time as a means of coping with 
distress (Posner & Rothbart, 1998), and appear to be subserved by the interaction of 
prefrontal cortical structures (e.g., anterior cingulate cortex, dorsolateral and medial PFC) 
with the amygdala and insula (Levesque et al., 2003; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 
2002; Ochsner et al., 2004). Thus, interventions that promote clarification of appraisals, 
disrupt perseverative cognition, and facilitate emotion regulation may prevent stressful 
encounters from precipitating or exacerbating the consumption of alcohol.  
In addition, interventions could target alcohol use action schema and the 
ensembles of maladaptive cognitive-behavior processes that lead to addictive 
consumption of alcohol. Therapies may increase attention to drinking triggers and the 
presence of urges, enabling a skillful deployment of coping strategies. If, as Rohsenow 
and colleagues (1994) observed, inattention to alcohol cues is correlated with increased 
drinking behaviors, then alcohol consumption may be decreased by enhancing attention 
to alcohol dependence triggers. Concomitantly, interventions could enable awareness of 
the engagement of alcohol use action schema when triggered by alcohol cues or negative 
affect, thereby allowing for the disruption of automatized drinking processes with a 
controlled coping response. Abstaining from use of alcohol requires the deployment of 
31 
 
cognitive control mechanisms in stressful situations where affect regulation is needed 
(Wiers et al., 2006). Psychosocial interventions might strengthen top-down cognitive 
control, thereby facilitating inhibition of alcohol use urges in the face of stress triggers. 
Additionally, stress-precipitated engagement of alcohol use action plans may also be 
interrupted by disengagement of attention from alcohol-relevant cues to allow for focus 
on neutral or health-promoting stimuli. Ultimately, repetitively engaging, disengaging, 
and moving attention away from alcohol-use triggers (including interoceptive data 
stemming from affective responses) toward innocuous or beneficial stimuli may weaken 
associative networks of alcohol use action schema. Lastly, treatment may help the alcohol 
dependent person to learn how to tolerate alcohol-related cognitions and craving without 
engaging in thought suppression. In so doing, alcohol cue-exposure may occur without 
the added burden of the post-suppression rebound effect, leading to the eventual 
extinction of conditioned appetitive responses. 
Although a number of cognitive-behavioral therapies might leverage some of the 
aforementioned therapeutic mechanisms, one such intervention, mindfulness training, 
holds promise for being especially well-suited as a treatment for stress-precipitated 
alcohol dependence. Mindfulness-based interventions have recently gained prominence 
in the psychological and medical literatures. Mindfulness involves self-regulation of a 
metacognitive form of attention: a nonreactive, non-evaluative monitoring of moment-by-
moment cognition, emotion, perception, and physiological state without fixation on 
thoughts of past and future (Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, & Davidson, 2008). A growing body of 
research suggests that mindfulness impacts stress, implicit cognition, and attentional 
processes (Brefczynski-Lewis, Lutz, Schaefer, Levinson, & Davidson, 2007; Jha, 
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Krompinger, & Baime, 2007; Lutz et al., 2008; Slagter et al., 2007; Tang et al., 2007; 
Wenk-Sormaz, 2005); hence, mindfulness training may comprehensively target a broad 
range of the pathogenic processes most central to stress-precipitated forms of alcohol 
dependence.  
Mindfulness training, which originates from Buddhist traditions but has been co-
opted by and translated for secular, Western clinicians, has been shown to exert 
significant, salutary effects on stress-related, biobehavioral conditions (for reviews, see 
Baer & Krietemeyer, 2006; Grossman, 2004; Ludwig & Kabat-Zinn, 2008). Research 
suggests that mindfulness-based treatments may improve clinical outcomes in substance-
abusing populations. Bowen et al. (2006) employed a nonrandomized pre-test post-test 
comparison group design to test the efficacy of a mindfulness meditation intervention for 
adults incarcerated within a minimum security correctional facility and found that 
mindfulness reduced substance use and substance-related problems to a greater extent 
than treatment as usual (TAU). Several other small pilot studies have examined the 
effects of mindfulness meditation on substance use disorders, including one which 
identified post-intervention attenuation of physiological stress (Marcus et al., 2003), and 
another which found significant decreases in heavy drinking days, stress, anxiety, 
depression, and the cytokine interleukin-6, a stress-responsive biomarker predictive of 
poor health outcomes (Zgierska et al., 2008). Although the four studies of mindfulness-
based treatments reviewed above suggest that the intervention may ameliorate factors 
related to stress-induced maintenance and relapse to alcohol dependence, the lack of 
random assignment presents serious threats to the validity of findings. Well-controlled 
studies are needed to strengthen the evidence base for this nascent therapy. 
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Hypothetically, mindfulness training may prevent stress-precipitated alcohol 
dependence relapse through a number of means, as delineated below. Mindfulness has 
been conceptualized as an awareness of stimuli without distortions and reactivity related 
to emotional valence (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007); hence, mindfulness training may 
increase the accuracy of primary and secondary stress appraisals (Garland, 2007) as well 
as facilitate cognitive reappraisal (Garland, Gaylord, & Park, 2009), attenuating 
exaggerated stress reactions stemming from perseverative cognitive processes such as 
catastrophizing or rumination. Given that mindfulness training has been shown to 
decrease negative affective reactions (e.g., Evans et al., 2007; Ma & Teasdale, 2004; 
Teasdale et al., 2002), such improved emotion regulation may reduce the risk of stress-
induced relapse. Second, mindfulness training may disrupt alcohol use action schema by 
increasing awareness of the presence of urges, enabling a skillful deployment of coping 
strategies. Mindfulness training may alert the individual to the engagement of alcohol use 
action schema when triggered by alcohol cues or negative affect, thereby disrupting 
automatized drinking processes with controlled cognitive operations. Third, mindfulness 
may facilitate exposure to alcohol-related cognitions and cravings without being subject 
to the paradoxical effects of urge suppression. Mindful exposure to alcohol cue-reactivity 
may prevent post-suppression rebound effects on the accessibility of alcohol-related 
thoughts (Palfai et al., 1997). Indeed, changes in thought suppression have been shown to 
partially mediate the effects of mindfulness training on alcohol use and drinking 
consequences (Bowen, Witkiewitz, Dillworth, & Marlatt, 2007). Fourth, because 
mindfulness training has been shown to potentiate attentional orienting functions (e.g., 
Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 2007), mindfulness-based interventions may facilitate 
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disengagement of attention from alcohol-relevant cues, weakening alcohol attentional 
biases to allow for focus on neutral or health-promoting stimuli.  
The stress reaction and its addictive consequences, then, are not eventualities, for 
with sufficient intervention and training threat appraisals can give way to reappraisals of 
self-efficacy, acceptance, or a sense of coherence even in the face of grave adversity. The 
encounter with the stressor can be met with a sense of resourcefulness or with an attitude 
of benefit-finding, and in so doing, what would have otherwise been perceived as 
threatening becomes a navigable and meaningful challenge. Through the generative 
cognitive process of re-attributing the meaning of ambiguous stimuli, the individual can 
attend to constructions of reality wherein they have the wherewithal to adapt to and solve 
the problems in their lives. Surely, it is this ability that is articulated in the addict’s 
supplication for “the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, to change the things I 
can, and the wisdom to know the difference.” The person recovering from alcohol 
dependence cannot avoid the ubiquity of stressors, but may be able to use problem-
focused coping to manage them. Where problem-solving approaches fall short, emotion-
focused strategies such as reappraisal and decentering can be employed, attenuating the 
affective reaction to the stressor. For the seriously and chronically dependent individual, 
attentional biases and cravings may automatically arise during the stress response, driving 
the impulse to relieve distress with alcohol. But herein may lay the power of volition, not 
in repressing the urge to drink, but in mindfully observing the addictive impulse as it 
arises, abides, and ceases without triggering alcohol consumption. In so doing, each 
moment of unanswered craving in the face of a stressor becomes an instance of extinction 
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learning that can break the chains of risk and ultimately fuel the recovery process with a 
sense of empowerment. 
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MINDFULNESS IS INVERSELY ASSOCIATED WITH ALCOHOL ATTENTIONAL 
BIAS AMONG RECOVERING ALCOHOL-DEPENDENT ADULTS 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
Although mindfulness training is a promising intervention for alcohol 
dependence, its therapeutic mechanisms are at present unspecified. Because mindfulness 
training may facilitate attentional disengagement (Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 2007), we 
hypothesized that mindfulness would be inversely associated with attentional bias toward 
visual alcohol cues. Fifty-four alcohol-dependent adults (mean age = 39.2, SD = 9.2) 
residing in a therapeutic community (TC) located in the southeastern U.S. completed self-
report questionnaires and a cognitive task. A majority of participants were male (85.2%), 
African American (53.7%), and had earned < $20,000 in the year before entering the TC 
(55.6%). The mean number of lifetime DSM-IV alcohol dependence criteria met by 
participants was 6.5 (SD = 1.0), and the mean number of standard alcoholic drinks 
consumed per day in the year before entering treatment was 18.8 (SD = 10.9).  Alcohol 
attentional bias was assessed with a dot probe task. Questionnaires were used to evaluate 
self-reported mindfulness, craving, and stress. Recovering alcohol-dependent individuals 
high in mindfulness exhibited less alcohol attentional bias (AB), stress and craving than 
their counterparts low in mindfulness. Multiple linear regression analysis indicated that 
mindfulness was more predictive of alcohol AB than either stress or craving. Among 
recovering alcohol-dependent adults mindfulness is associated with alcohol AB. 
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Alcohol dependence involves implicit cognitive processes (Wiers et al., 2006) and 
attentional biases (AB) toward alcohol-relevant stimuli (Field and Cox, 2008) that drive 
appetitive states and compulsive drinking. Recurrent alcohol misuse is thought to 
establish schemata that compel alcohol consumption through automatized sequences of 
context-dependent behavior (Tiffany, 1990). Engagement of alcohol use action schemata 
may result in implicit processing of salient stimuli, manifested as an involuntary AB 
towards alcohol cues. Such bias is evident in visual probe tasks, in which heavy drinkers 
preferentially attend to alcohol cues, resulting in decreased reaction times (RTs) to probes 
replacing alcohol photographs compared to probes replacing neutral photographs (e.g., 
Field et al., 2004). Alcohol AB has been linked to subjective craving; persons 
experimentally manipulated to attend to alcohol stimuli experience increased cravings 
and consume more beer than persons trained to attend to neutral stimuli (Field and 
Eastwood, 2005). Although the causal relationship between AB and alcohol consumption 
is unknown, data suggest that drinking urges and behaviors can be modulated by 
attention. Among persons who drink to cope with negative affect, stress increases alcohol 
AB and craving (Field and Powell, 2007). Whether through invocation of automatic, 
appetitive responses or displacement of cognitive resources, alcohol AB may foster 
and/or maintain alcohol dependence, impeding recovery in alcohol dependent persons.  
 Given that automaticity and AB may be integral components of alcohol 
dependence, interventions affecting attention and implicit cognition may hold promise for 
its treatment. One such intervention, mindfulness meditation, has in recent years gained 
prominence for its apparent efficacy in treating stress-related, biobehavioral conditions 
(Ludwig and Kabat-Zinn, 2008). Mindfulness involves self-regulation of a metacognitive 
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form of attention: a nonreactive, non-evaluative monitoring of moment-by-moment 
cognition, emotion, and physiological state without fixation on thoughts of past and 
future (Lutz et al., 2008) that negatively correlates with factors such as thought 
suppression, alexithymia, and emotion dysregulation (Baer et al., 2006). Although there 
are significant individual differences in dispositional mindfulness, this metacognitive 
faculty can be fostered by training (Carmody and Baer, 2008). Recent research suggests 
that mindfulness-based treatments may improve clinical outcomes in substance-misusing 
populations (e.g., Bowen et al., 2006). While there is evidence that the salutary effect of 
mindfulness training on substance use is partially mediated by reductions in thought 
suppression (Bowen et al., 2007), it is plausible that this effect may also be mediated by 
the influence of mindfulness on attentional processes implicated in addiction.  
At present, the processes by which mindfulness may promote recovery from 
alcohol dependence are unknown. Thus, we examined relationships between mindfulness, 
alcohol AB, stress, craving, and thought suppression among alcohol-dependent adults 
residing in a therapeutic community. Because mindfulness training may facilitate 
purposive disengagement of attention on attentional tasks (Jha et al., 2007; Slagter et al., 
2007; Tang et al., 2007), we hypothesized that individuals with higher levels of 
mindfulness would evidence less AB toward visual alcohol cues relative to individuals 
with lower mindfulness. 
Methods 
Sample characteristics and study design 
Study participants were 54 alcohol-dependent adults who had resided for at least 
18 months (M = 21.9, SD = 2.5, range = 18 to 28 months) in a therapeutic community 
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(TC). In this program, after 18 months individuals obtain employment outside of the TC 
and thus become at higher risk for relapse due to increased access to alcohol. Potential 
study participants were administered the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test 
(AUDIT) and completed a semi-structured diagnostic interview conducted by a Master’s-
level social worker to ensure that all participants met lifetime DSM-IV criteria for 
alcohol dependence.  A majority of participants were men (85.2%); 53.7% were African 
American and 40.7% were Caucasian. With regard to income in the year before entering 
treatment, 55.6% had earned < $20,000, and 29.6% had earned $20,000-$40,000. The 
mean age of the sample was 39.2 (SD = 9.2). The mean number of DSM-IV alcohol 
dependence criteria met by participants was 6.5 (SD = 1.0), and the mean total AUDIT 
score for the sample was 33.3 (SD = 4.9). The mean number of standard alcoholic drinks 
consumed per day in the year before entering treatment was 18.8 (SD = 10.9).  All 
participants reported having continuously abstained from use of psychoactive substances 
during their residence in the TC. Reports of abstinence were corroborated by random 
urinalyses conducted at the TC on an as needed basis, as well as through daily 
observation by program staff. During a single, hour-long assessment period conducted on 
premises at the TC, study participants first completed several standardized psychosocial 
instruments, including the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2006), 
Perceived Stress Scale (Cohen et al., 1983), and Penn Alcohol Craving Scale (Flannery et 
al., 1999). Next, participants were engaged in a computer-based dot probe task 
(MacLeod, et al, 1986) as a measure of alcohol AB. All measures were administered in 
the same order across participants in a single session. This measurement protocol was 
part of a baseline assessment of a randomized controlled pilot trial of a mindfulness-
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oriented treatment for alcohol dependence. After this baseline assessment, participants 
were randomly assigned to either a mindfulness-promoting treatment or social support 
group for alcohol dependence. The results of this clinical intervention study are reported 
in Chapter III. 
 
Table 1. Sample Characteristics 
 
Variable M or % 
Length of stay in residential program (M, SD) 21.9 (2.5) 
Gender N (%)  
Male 46 (85.2) 
Female 8 (14.8) 
Race N (%)  
African American 29 (53.7) 
Caucasian 22 (40.7) 
Other 3 (5.6) 
Age (M, SD) 39.2 (9.2) 
DSM-IV Dependence Criteria (M, SD) 6.5 (1.0) 
Income before entering TC N (%)  
<$20,000 30 (55.6) 
$20,000-40,000 16 (29.6) 
$41,000-60,000 5 (9.3) 
$61,000-80,000 1 (1.9) 
>$80,000 2 (3.7) 
Drinks per day (M, SD) 18.8 (10.9) 
AUDIT (M, SD) 32.3 (4.9) 
DAST (M, SD) 21.4 (4.6) 
 
Measures 
Mindfulness. The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ, α = .81), 
comprised of 39 likert-type items, was used to measure self-reported mindfulness. The 
FFMQ yields a total score and scores for five internally consistent mindfulness factors 
each with their own convergent and predictive validity: nonreactivity to inner experience 
(tapped by items such as “I watch my feelings without getting lost in them”), observing 
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and attending to experience (“I pay attention to sensations, such as the wind in my hair or 
the sun on my face”), describing and discriminating emotional experiences (“I’m good at 
finding words to describe my feelings”), nonjudging of experience (“I tell myself I 
shouldn’t be feeling the way that I am feeling”), and acting with awareness (“I find 
myself doing things without paying attention”) (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & 
Toney, 2006). 
Alcohol attentional bias. A dot probe task (MacLeod, et al, 1986) created in E-
Prime 1.2 (PST Inc., Pittsburgh, PA) and presented on an IBM T60 laptop with a 15” 
screen was used to measure alcohol AB. In each trial, two grayscale images appeared, 
one on each side of a fixation cross (+); one image was neutral in content, the other was 
alcohol-related. The pair of images was presented for either 200 ms or 2000 ms. 
Left/right position of the alcohol images and presentation duration were both randomized 
and counterbalanced across 20 practice trials and 160 trials. Following a 50 ms inter-
stimulus interval (ISI), a target probe (two dots) replaced one of the images and a 
distracter probe (one dot) replaced the other image; probes appeared for 100 ms. 
Participants were instructed to fixate on the cross between the images and indicate the 
location of the target probe by responding with a left or right button press on a keypad. 
Target probes randomly replaced alcohol and neutral images with equal frequency.  
Some parameters of the task employed here vary slightly from tasks used 
previously to study addiction-related AB. Two notable differences are: (1) the fixation 
point remains on the screen throughout the duration of each trial, and (2) dots appear in 
both probe locations, requiring participants to discriminate between the location with one 
dot and the location with 2 dots.  This task design was chosen to eliminate confounding 
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contributions of automatic, reflexive attention that are not related to the image cues. In 
particular, both sudden onsets and offsets have been found to capture attention 
(Hopfinger and Maxwell, 2005), and the sudden offset of the fixation cross, or the sudden 
onset of a target probe at only one location, could interfere with any spatial shift in 
attention caused by the pictorial cues, especially in trials with the short (200ms) stimulus 
onset asynchrony (SOA). More specifically, if the fixation cross were to disappear when 
the dot probes appeared, attention would likely be drawn to the middle of the screen 
reducing the power to detect attentional allocation shifts due to the alcohol image cues. 
Additionally, if a probe appeared in only location, participants’ attention would be 
reflexively captured by the probe. Including a place marker in the opposite target probe 
location, requires the participant’s attention to be directed to the spatial location of the 
target probe and ensures that response selection cannot be based on detection of the probe 
through peripheral vision. Moreover, use of two probes requires greater attentional 
resources than detection of a single probe and thus this design may have more power to 
resolve attentional shifts elicited by alcohol cues. 
Alcohol stimuli included 13 photographs of alcoholic drinks (i.e., liquor, beer, 
etc), as well as 7 photos of persons drinking alcohol. Neutral stimuli included 13 photos 
of kitchen items and 7 photos of persons in kitchen scenes. Stimulus sets were analyzed 
with respect to their spatial frequency content to ensure that they did not differ in terms of 
basic visual properties, which could elicit reflexive attentional capture irrespective of 
image content. On measures of spectral peak (Neutral: 0.0180, Alcohol: 0.0176, 
t(38)=0.383, p=0.704) and spectral width (Neutral: 59.20, Alcohol: 59.29, t(38)=-0.027, 
p=0.979), the two stimulus sets were not significantly different.  
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Alcohol craving and perceived stress. Subjective alcohol craving was assessed 
with Penn Alcohol Craving Scale (PACS, α = .91) (Flannery et al., 2001). Participants 
use a 7-point scale to indicate craving frequency and intensity over the past week on 
items like “How often have you thought about drinking or about how good a drink would 
make you feel?” and “At its most severe point, how strong was your craving?” The 10-
item Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-10, α = .85) was used to assess on a 5-point scale how 
often (0 = never, 4 = very often) in the past month participants found their lives 
unpredictable, uncontrollable, and overwhelming (Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 
1983), and includes items such as “How often have you felt nervous and ‘stressed’?” and 
“How often have you felt that you were on top of things?”  
Data analysis 
For AB data, trials with extreme RTs, defined as those with RTs longer than +3 
SD above the individual mean (c.f., Field et al., 2004), were discarded as outliers (mean = 
2.5±1.5 per  participant); error trials were also discarded. For each participant, AB scores 
were calculated by subtracting their mean RT to target probes replacing alcohol photos 
from their mean RT to target probes replacing neutral photos, such that positive bias 
scores indicate an AB toward visual alcohol cues. All data are reported as means ± SD 
unless otherwise noted. 
 Bivariate correlations, t-tests, and multiple linear regression analyses were 
performed with SPSS 16.0. Multiple linear regression was used for hypothesis testing, in 
which age, gender, number of DSM-IV alcohol dependence criteria endorsed, 
mindfulness, craving, and perceived stress were entered simultaneously, to examine the 
percentage of variance in alcohol AB explained by these variables. Potential 
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multicollinearity issues were screened by examining the variance inflation factor (VIF) of 
each variable. There were no variables with VIF > 1.5. 
Results 
Dot probe task 
Mean accuracy on the dot probe task was 97.2%± 0.4%. Mean RT to target 
probes replacing alcohol photos presented for 2000 ms was 587.7 ± 120.8 ms, whereas 
mean RT for neutral photos was 585.3 ± 123.9 ms. Mean RT to target probes replacing 
alcohol photos presented for 200ms was 588.10 ± 119.5 ms, whereas mean RT for neutral 
photos was 584.73 ± 121.9 ms. Paired t-tests revealed nonsignificant differences between 
RTs to alcohol and neutral photos for each SOA: for 200 ms, t(53) = 1.45, p=.15, and for 
2000 ms, t(53) = .96, p=.34. 
 Despite that both 2000 and 200 ms AB data were approximately normally 
distributed (both yielding non-significant Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for normality), 
approximately one-half of participants exhibited 2000 and 200 ms AB towards probes 
replacing alcohol photos while the other half exhibited AB towards probes replacing 
neutral photos. Given that AB towards alcohol cues is theorized to represent appetitive 
conditioning (Field & Cox, 2008), whereas AB away from alcohol cues is thought to 
represent disengagement from or avoidance of the alcohol (Townshend & Duka, 2007), 
we analyzed data from participants with these two apparently distinct types of AB 
separately. Thus, for each presentation duration (2000 ms and 200 ms) we divided 
participants into two groups: those with an AB > 0 (i.e., the alcohol approach group) and 
those with an AB < 0 (i.e., the alcohol disengagement group). Mean 2000 ms AB for the 
approach group (N = 24) was = 13.1 ± 8.9 ms, whereas the mean 2000 ms AB for the 
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disengagement group (N = 30) was -14.8 ± 13.3 ms. Mean 200 ms AB for the approach 
group (N = 25) was 10.9 ± 8.4 ms, whereas the mean 200 ms AB for the disengagement 
group (N = 29) was -15.8 ± 12.1 ms.  
Bivariate relationships between mindfulness, AB, craving, and stress 
Correlation coefficients for variables of interest are reported in Table 1. 
Mindfulness was significantly negatively associated with 2000 ms alcohol AB, subjective 
alcohol craving, perceived stress, and thought suppression. Nonreactivity to inner 
experience and describing experience with words were the only mindfulness factors 
significantly inversely correlated with 2000 ms alcohol AB. With regard to 200 ms AB, 
although overall mindfulness was uncorrelated with this variable, the mindfulness 
subscale of nonjudging of experience was significantly negatively correlated with this 
attentional bias for short (200 ms) duration alcohol stimuli.
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Table 2: Bivariate Correlations Between Mindfulness, Craving, Stress, Thought Suppression, and Attentional Bias in Abstinent 
Alcohol Dependent Adults (N = 54) 
 
  FMQ NONR OBS DES NONJ ACT AB200 AB2000 ACS PSS 
Total mindfulness (FMQ) 1          
Nonreactivity to inner experience (NONR) .46*** 1         
Observing/attending to experience (OBS) .61*** .29* 1        
Describing experience with words (DES) .76*** .31* .34* 1       
Nonjudging of experience (NONJ) .38** .03 .13 -.06 1      
Acting with awareness (ACT) .67*** -.10 .03 .48*** .17 1     
Alcohol attentional bias 200 ms (AB200)  .13 .15 .14 -.04 -.27* -.02 1    
Alcohol attentional bias 2000 ms (AB2000) -.39** -27* -.20 -.37** -.07 -.26 .02 1   
Alcohol craving scale (ACS) -.38** -.28* -.49*** -.32* .12 -.18 -.17 .13 1  
Perceived stress scale (PSS) -.37** -.41** -.19 -.27 -.13 -.19 -.15 .02 .17 1 
 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p≤.001 
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Relationship between mindfulness and alcohol approach/disengagement bias 
Given the set of observed significant correlations, the dichotomized 2000 ms 
attentional bias variable (approach and avoidance) was used to predict variation in 
mindfulness. One-way ANOVA showed that participants with 2000 ms alcohol approach 
biases had significantly lower mindfulness, F(1, 52) = 5.09, p<.05, than those with 
disengagement biases.   
Multivariate analysis of alcohol AB 
When age, sex, number of DSM-IV alcohol dependence criteria, mindfulness, 
craving, and perceived stress were entered simultaneously into a multiple linear 
regression model predicting 2000 ms alcohol AB, mindfulness was the sole, statistically 
significant predictor, indicating that mindfulness scores accounted for a significant 
portion of variation in alcohol AB [β= -.37, p =.029] after controlling for the influence 
the demographic and clinically-relevant variables listed above. Despite that the 
relationship between mindfulness and 2000 ms alcohol AB was statistically significant 
the model only explained 14% of the variance in alcohol AB. Regression parameters are 
reported in Table 3.
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Table 3: Summary of Simultaneous-Entry Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for 
Variables Predicting 2000 ms Alcohol AB Among Alcohol Dependent Patients (N = 54) 
Variable B SE B β 
Age -.07 .26 -.04 
Sex -1.36 6.63 -.03 
# DSM-IV dependence criteria 1.91 2.50 .10 
  Mindfulness -.43 .19 -.37* 
  Craving -.13 .51 -.04 
  Perceived stress -.18 .42 -.07 
Note. R2 = .14. * p < .05. 
 
Discussion 
Mindfulness was significantly inversely correlated with alcohol AB, perceived 
stress, and subjective alcohol craving among recovering alcohol dependent adults.  
Mindfulness was the sole significant predictor of alcohol AB after controlling for the 
influence of stress and craving, variables which have been linked with alcohol AB in 
prior studies (Field & Powell, 2007). To our knowledge, this is the first report identifying 
significant associations between self-reported mindfulness and alcohol dependence-
related factors.  
Among the present sample of alcohol dependent adults in a long-term TC, 
mindfulness was more closely related to alcohol AB than measures of stress or craving. 
Indeed, low mindfulness may reflect enhanced risk for addictive urges, automatic 
appetitive responses, and/or attentional fixation onto alcohol cues. Persons in recovery 
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with low levels of mindfulness may be especially susceptible to relapse. Of course, given 
the modest r-squared of our model, mindfulness only accounts for a portion of the 
variance in alcohol AB among alcohol dependent individuals, and other important factors 
that were omitted by the present investigation may contribute to attentional fixation on 
alcohol cues.  
Because mindfulness was inversely correlated with attentional bias towards visual 
alcohol cues presented for 2000 ms but not for 200 ms, it appears as if mindfulness 
relates to attentional hold or maintenance of attention rather than initial orienting 
processes. It may be that relative to those who are low in mindfulness, recovering alcohol 
dependent persons reporting high levels of mindfulness are less fixated on alcohol cues or 
perhaps are better able to disengage and shift attention away from alcohol cues. Given 
that mindfulness training appears to potentiate attentional re-orienting functions (Jha et 
al., 2007), mindfulness-promoting interventions may facilitate disengagement of attention 
from alcohol to allow for a focus on neutral or health-promoting objects, persons, and 
experiences. Ultimately, repetitively engaging, disengaging, and moving attention away 
from alcohol cues toward innocuous or beneficial stimuli may weaken associative 
networks of alcohol use action schemata and strengthen an alcohol dependent person’s 
ability to avoid relapse. However, it should be noted that the present study is correlational 
in nature, and thus the identified relationship between mindfulness and alcohol AB 
should not be taken as evidence in support of a potential effect of mindfulness training on 
addiction-related attentional processes.  
Among mindfulness factors, nonreactivity to internal experience and 
describing/differentiating cognitive-emotional experience appear to be related to 
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decreased alcohol approach bias. These findings are interesting in light of the relationship 
between emotion dysregulation and alcohol dependence. A large corpus of research has 
associated stress reactivity, negative affect, and the appetitive drive to consume alcohol. 
Additionally, alexithymia has predicted poor outcomes among alcohol-misusing 
inpatients (Loas, Fremaux, Otmani, Lecercle, & Delahousse, 1997). The observed inverse 
relationship between mindfulness facets and alcohol AB may reflect self-regulatory 
competence among recovering alcohol dependent persons reporting high levels of 
mindfulness. Thus, mindfulness may reduce attentional fixation on alcohol cues by 
promoting awareness of and detachment from experiences of negative affect or addictive 
urges. 
Although overall mindfulness was uncorrelated with 200 ms AB, the mindfulness 
facet of nonjudging was significantly associated with this shorter duration AB, suggesting 
that recovering alcohol dependent adults who experience greater attentional capture by 
alcohol cues also tend to be less judgmental of their thoughts and feelings. It is possible 
that persons with strong, automatic appetitive responses towards alcohol may be unaware 
of such responses, and therefore do not judge or attempt to inhibit these responses. Given 
the fact that alcohol pictures presented for 200 ms elicit implicit attentional biases, they 
may represent an unconscious desire to approach alcohol that is typically inaccessible to 
conscious self-regulatory efforts. As a contrasting explanation, the tendency to negatively 
judge alcohol-related cognitions and cravings may lead to aversive implicit alcohol 
associations, resulting in decreased appetitive reactions towards alcohol among persons 
in recovery from addiction. Because the correlational nature of the data precludes causal 
inference, experimental research is needed to clarify these relationships further. 
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Despite reports that heavy drinkers have alcohol approach biases on visual probe 
tasks (cf., Field, 2006), research has identified attentional disengagement from alcohol 
cues among abstinent alcohol dependent persons in recovery (Stormark, Field, Hugdahl, 
& Horowitz, 1997; Townshend and Duka, 2007). In contrast, Noel et al. (2006) found an 
absence of AB in alcohol dependent inpatients at 1,250 ms stimulus durations but an AB 
for alcohol pictures presented for 50 ms. Although the mean 2000 and 200 ms AB for our 
sample was not statistically significantly different than zero, closer inspection of 
individual differences revealed that the sample was comprised of persons with significant 
alcohol approach and alcohol disengagement biases. This finding is understandable given 
that one might expect significant heterogeneity of responses to long-term participation in 
a TC; many residents might successfully learn to avoid temptation by directing their 
attention away from alcohol while others might still harbor covert urges to drink indexed 
by alcohol approach AB. Alternatively, the lack of a significant mean AB in this study 
may stem from our use of a modified dot probe task using a stationary fixation cross, 
which might decrease visual scanning of the pictures and thereby limit task sensitivity. A 
third explanation for the lack of significant mean alcohol AB across the sample may be 
due to the relatively unusual nature of the sample itself. Study participants were recruited 
from a long-term TC, and thus on the whole alcohol AB may have been extinguished 
after an average of nearly 22 months of residing in a therapeutic milieu. Certainly, the 
long length of treatment may have led to higher levels of mindfulness than may be 
observed in typical alcohol dependent populations. In spite of this caveat, the present 
study suggests that degree of mindfulness may predict the extent to which the attention of 
alcohol dependent individuals is biased towards alcohol cues.  
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 In summary, the present data provide novel evidence associating mindfulness and 
factors linked to onset and maintenance of alcohol dependence. Whether mindfulness 
training can impact alcohol AB over time remains a question to be explored by future 
research. 
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MINDFULNESS TRAINING AFFECTS COGNITIVE, EMOTIONAL, AND 
PHYSIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS IMPLICATED IN ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE: 
RESULTS OF A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED PILOT TRIAL 
 
ABSTRACT 
The risk chain of stress-precipitated alcohol dependence relapse may be malleable 
to targeted behavioral therapies. Data is presented from a pilot-test of a mindfulness-
oriented recovery enhancement (MORE) intervention designed to disrupt cognitive, 
affective, and physiological mechanisms implicated in stress-precipitated alcohol 
dependence. Fifty-three alcohol-dependent adults (mean age = 40.3, SD = 9.4) recruited 
from a long-term therapeutic community were randomly assigned to either 10 weeks of 
mindfulness training or an alcohol dependence support group (ASG). A majority of 
participants were male (79.2%), African American (60.4%), and had earned < $20,000 in 
the year before entering the TC (52.8%). Repeated measures analyses of variance were 
used to explore the differential effects of treatment on clinical self-report measures, a 
psychophysiological cue-reactivity protocol, and a dot-probe task designed to measure 
alcohol attentional bias (AB). 37 participants completed the interventions. Relative to 
ASG (n = 18), MORE (n = 18) resulted in medium-large effect size reductions in 
perceived stress and thought suppression, increased HRV recovery from alcohol cues, 
and significant effects on alcohol AB. Mindfulness training appears to effect cognitive, 
affective, and physiological risk mechanisms implicated in alcohol dependence relapse. 
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Few social ills are as pernicious and persistent as alcohol dependence. Despite 
more than a century of intervention efforts, 28.4% of persons ever treated for alcohol 
problems remain dependent on alcohol and 19.1% continue to exhibit alcohol abuse or 
subclinical dependence symptoms in the past year (Dawson et al., 2005).  Clearly, extant 
interventions are not effective for all alcohol misusers.  Persons who drink to cope with 
stress have significantly higher rates of lifetime and current alcohol dependence 
symptoms than persons who drink for other reasons (Schroder & Perrine, 2007), and 
stress is known to increase risk of relapse (Sinha, 2007). Alcohol users have a 
comparatively high likelihood of experiencing serious life stressors: within the population 
of adult past-year drinkers, 72.5% reported experiencing at least one stressful life event in 
the past year, and 23.2% experienced 3 to 5 such stressors (Dawson, Grant, & Ruan, 
2005). The experience of stressful life events significantly predicts quantity and 
frequency of alcohol consumption; for example, drinkers who reported experiencing six 
or more stressful events in the past year consumed, on average, more than three times the 
amount of ethanol per day than did alcohol users who denied experiencing any such 
stressors (Dawson, Grant, & Ruan, 2005). Congruent with such findings, an event-history 
analysis of 1786 young adults found that both distal and proximal exposure to stressful 
life events significantly predicted onset of alcohol dependence in a linear and additive 
fashion after controlling for socioeconomic status and history of psychiatric disorder, 
implicating a causal role for life stress in the etiology of the disorder (Lloyd & Turner, 
2008).  Convergent evidence suggests that stress is a common precipitant of alcohol 
misuse and may play an important role in the pathogenesis of formal alcohol use 
disorders.  
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The central risk chain of stress-precipitated alcohol misuse, dependence, and 
relapse involves cognitive-affective mechanisms that may be explicated by an integrated 
biopsychosocial framework (Garland, 2009). In brief, stress appraisals coupled with 
deficits in coping resources result in psychophysiological reactivity, perseverative 
cognition, and negative affect, which in turn trigger automatized schemata to deploy 
sequences of maladaptive cognitive-behavioral processes that result in compulsive 
alcohol consumption in spite of often severe consequences for drinking.  
Stress-activated engagement of alcohol use action schemata may result in implicit 
processing of salient stimuli, manifested as an involuntary attentional bias (AB) towards 
alcohol cues. Such bias is evident in visual probe tasks, in which heavy drinkers 
preferentially attend to alcohol cues, resulting in decreased reaction times (RTs) to probes 
replacing alcohol photographs presented for 500 and 2000 ms compared to probes 
replacing neutral photographs presented for the same duration (Field, Mogg, Zetteler, & 
Bradley, 2004). Conversely, although alcohol dependent patients have been shown to 
exhibit an AB toward alcohol cues presented for 50 ms (Noel et al., 2006), they evidence 
AB away from alcohol cues presented for 500 ms (Stormark, Field, Hugdahl, & 
Horowitz, 1997; Townshend & Duka, 2007). Collectively, these findings suggest that 
alcohol dependent individuals evince treatment-induced attentional disengagement from 
or avoidance of alcohol cues presented for longer stimulus durations (which allow for 
conscious mediation of attention), but continue to exhibit implicit appetitive attentional 
responses for stimuli presented at subliminal durations. Alcohol AB been linked to 
subjective craving and alcohol consumption; in one study, persons manipulated to attend 
to alcohol stimuli experienced increased craving and consumed more beer than persons 
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trained to attend to neutral stimuli (Field & Eastwood, 2005). Although the causal 
relationship between AB and alcohol consumption is unknown, data suggest that drinking 
urges and behaviors can be modulated by attention. Among persons who drink to cope 
with dysphoria, stress enhances alcohol AB and craving (Field & Powell, 2007).  
Alcohol dependent individuals exposed to visual or olfactory alcohol cues exhibit 
significant psychophysiological reactivity (Carter & Tiffany, 1999). When attention is 
fixated on such cues, increased craving may impel alcohol consumption as a means of 
reducing distress. Many persons recovering from alcohol use disorders attempt to 
suppress cravings, which, paradoxically, serves only to increase intrusive, automatic 
alcohol-related cognitions (Palfai, Monti, Colby, & Rohsenow, 1997), dysphoria, and 
autonomic arousal (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). Indeed, among alcohol dependent 
persons, thought suppression is negatively correlated with vagally-mediated heart rate 
variability (Ingjaldsson, Laberg, & Thayer, 2003), a putative index of emotion regulation 
and parasympathetic inhibition of stress reactions (Thayer & Lane, 2000). As thoughts of 
drinking intensify and are coupled with psychobiological distress, the impulse to 
consume alcohol as a form of palliative coping may overcome depleted self-regulation 
strength (Muraven, Collins, & Nienhaus, 2002; Muraven & Shmueli, 2006) leading to 
relapse. The attempt to avoid distress or allay its impact through compulsive alcohol 
consumption results in negative reinforcement conditioning that may perpetuate this 
cycle by further sensitizing the brain to future stressful encounters via allostatic 
dysregulation of neuroendocrine systems (Koob, 2003). Components of this risk chain 
may be especially malleable to behavioral therapies that target cognitive mediators of 
pathogenic gene-environment interactions. 
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Given that negative affect, autonomic arousal, automaticity, and attentional biases 
appear to be integral components of the risk chain for stress-precipitated alcohol misuse, 
dependence, and relapse, interventions targeting these mechanisms may hold promise for 
its treatment. One such intervention, mindfulness training, which originates from 
Buddhist traditions but has been co-opted by Western clinicians, has recently gained 
prominence in the psychological and medical literatures for its salutary effects on stress-
related biobehavioral conditions (Baer & Krietemeyer, 2006; Ludwig & Kabat-Zinn, 
2008). Mindfulness involves self-regulation of a metacognitive form of attention: a 
nonreactive, non-evaluative monitoring of moment-by-moment cognition, emotion, 
perception, and physiological state without fixation on thoughts of past or future 
(Garland, 2007). A growing body of research suggests that mindfulness affects implicit 
cognition and attentional processes (Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 2007; Lutz, Slagter, 
Dunne, & Davidson, 2008; Slagter et al., 2007; Slagter, Lutz, Greischar, Nieuwenhuis, & 
Davidson, 2009; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005) as well as heart rate variability indices of 
parasympathetic regulation (Tang et al., 2009). This evidence, coupled with knowledge 
that alcohol use disorders involve automaticity and attentional biases, suggests that 
mindfulness training may be an effective treatment for alcohol dependent persons coping 
with stress and dysphoria.  
Research suggests that mindfulness treatments may enhance clinical outcomes in 
substance-abusing populations. Bowen et al. (2007) employed a nonrandomized pre-post 
comparison group design to test the efficacy of a mindfulness meditation intervention for 
adults incarcerated within a minimum security correctional facility and found that 
mindfulness reduced post-release substance use, substance-related problems, and 
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psychiatric symptoms to a greater extent than standard chemical dependency services 
offered at the prison. Several other smaller pilot studies have examined the effects of 
mindfulness meditation on addictive disorders and found significant reductions in 
variables such as perceived stress, negative affect, stress-related biomarkers, and 
substance use (Marcus, Fine, & Kouzekanani, 2001; Marcus et al., 2003; Zgierska et al., 
2008). Despite the suggestive evidence provided by these studies that mindfulness 
interventions may ameliorate factors related to stress-precipitated alcohol misuse, their 
lack of random assignment of participants to mindfulness and comparison conditions 
presents serious threats to the validity of the findings. Although mindfulness meditation 
is a promising intervention for substance misusers, better-controlled research is needed 
with different populations of substance abusers to assess the efficacy of the approach and 
its clinical utility. In addition, performance-based, behavioral measures and 
psychophysiological assessments should be used as indices of intervention-related 
change. Lastly, to elucidate therapeutic mechanisms of action, intervention effects on 
potential mediators of alcohol misuse should be assessed and accounted for in subsequent 
analyses. 
To that end, we conducted a pilot randomized controlled trial of a mindfulness 
intervention designed to disrupt cognitive, affective, and physiological risk mechanisms 
implicated in stress-precipitated relapse to alcohol consumption. A randomized, 
controlled design was used to compare the therapeutic effects of a mindfulness-oriented 
recovery enhancement (MORE) intervention to those of an evidence-based alcohol 
dependence support group (ASG) in a sample of low-income, primarily African 
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American alcohol dependent adults recruited from a long-term, modified therapeutic 
community (TC). 
We hypothesized that MORE would result in significantly larger decreases in 
perceived stress, impaired alcohol response inhibition, craving for alcohol, psychiatric 
symptoms, and thought suppression and significantly larger increases in mindfulness than 
ASG. In addition, we hypothesized that mindfulness training, relative to ASG, would lead 
to increased heart rate variability (HRV) recovery from stress-primed alcohol cues. 
Lastly, we hypothesized that mindfulness training would reduce alcohol AB, a presumed 
mechanism of change, by the intervention midpoint and prior to changes in clinical 
outcomes, such that MORE would result in significantly larger decreases in alcohol AB 
than ASG for participants with pre-treatment alcohol approach bias but not for those with 
baseline alcohol disengagement bias. This hypothesis was justified on the rationale that 
participants with pre-treatment alcohol disengagement bias had already learned during 
their TC participation to disengage their attention from alcohol cues and would therefore 
exhibit a floor effect.  
METHOD 
Sample Characteristics 
The sample was comprised of alcohol-dependent adults who were living in a TC 
serving persons with substance-use disorders. The TC serves approximately 400 
individuals annually, 33% of whom are homeless prior to entering the program.  
Potential participants met study inclusion criteria if they were ≥18 years old, met 
lifetime Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV (DSM-IV) alcohol 
dependence criteria, and had resided in the TC for ≥18 months. In this program, after 18 
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months individuals begin to obtain employment outside of the TC and transition to 
independent living arrangements, thus becoming at higher risk for relapse due to 
increased access to alcohol. We targeted the intervention to this group given their 
increased exposure to high-risk situations. Although persons with active suicidal ideation 
or psychosis were excluded from this study, nearly all participants had misused other 
psychoactive substances, and many reported numerous psychiatric symptoms on the Brief 
Symptom Inventory (Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983). 
Table 4 presents sample characteristics. Study participants (N = 53) had resided in 
the TC for a mean of 22.3 ± 3.7 months. A majority of participants were male (79.2%); 
60.4% were African American and 34.0% were Caucasian. With regard to income in the 
year before entering the TC, 52.8% had earned < $20,000, and 32.1% earned $20,000-
$40,000 in 2008 U.S. dollars. The mean age of the sample was 40.3 ± 9.4, and ranged 
from 19 to 57 years old. Participants reported high rates of exposure to traumatic 
violence: for example, the mean number of times participants had been attacked with a 
knife or gun by someone trying to seriously hurt or kill them was 2.4 ± 2.0 times. The 
mean number of DSM-IV alcohol dependence criteria met by participants was 6.5 ± 1.0, 
and the mean total Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT) score for the 
sample was 32.3 ± 5.6. The mean number of standard alcoholic drinks consumed per day 
in the year before entering treatment was 19.0 ± 10.9, and the mean number of drinking 
days in the month before entering the TC was 22.8 ± 9.9.  Approximately 81% of the 
sample reported daily use of at least one psychoactive drug in addition to alcohol before 
entering the TC, with cocaine the most frequently used drug (M = 17.1 ± 12.5 days used 
in the month before entering the TC). All participants reported continuous abstinence 
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from psychoactive substance use during their residence in the TC, which ranged from 18 
to 28 months. Reports of abstinence were corroborated by random urinalysis conducted at 
the TC, as well as through daily evaluation from program staff.    
 
Table 4. Pre-intervention Characteristics of MORE and ASG Intervention Groups, and 
Total Study Participants 
 
Variable  MORE 
(N=27) 
ASG 
(N=26) 
Total 
(N = 53) 
Length of stay in residential program (M, SD) 22.4 (2.6) 22.2 (4.6) 22.3 (3.7) 
Gender N (%)    
Male 22 (81.5) 20 (76.9) 42 (79.2) 
Female 5 (18.5) 6 (23.1) 11 (20.8) 
Race N (%)    
African American 17 (62.9) 15 (57.7) 32 (60.4) 
Caucasian 7 (25.9) 11 (42.3) 18 (34.0) 
Other 3 (11.1) 0 3 (5.6) 
Age (M, SD) 39.9 (8.7) 40.7 (10.2) 40.3 (9.4) 
DSM-IV Dependence Criteria (M, SD) 6.5 (0.9) 6.6 (0.9) 6.5 (1.0) 
Income before entering TC N (%)    
<$20,000 14 (51.9) 14 (51.9) 28 (52.8) 
$20,000-40,000 9 (33.3) 8 (30.8) 16 (32.1) 
$41,000-60,000 2 (7.4) 3 (11.5) 5 (9.4) 
$61,000-80,000 1 (3.7) 0 1 (1.9) 
>$80,000 1 (3.7) 1 (3.8) 2 (3.8) 
Drinks per day prior to entering TC (M, SD) 21.4 (11.9) 16.6 (9.5) 19.0 (10.9) 
AUDIT (M, SD) 32.8 (6.0) 31.8 (5.3) 32.3 (5.6) 
DAST (M, SD) 20.7 (5.1) 21.2 (5.8) 21.0 (5.4) 
Psychiatric symptoms:    
 Depression 4.9 (4.6) 5.0 (4.4) 4.9 (4.4) 
 Anxiety 5.8 (3.8) 5.0 (4.3) 5.4 (4.1) 
 Hostility 4.0 (3.6) 4.3 (3.8) 4.2 (3.6) 
 Interpersonal sensitivity 4.4 (3.8) 3.9 (3.4) 4.2 (3.6) 
Trauma:    
 # of times seen someone killed in person 3.0 (3.2) 2.7 (2.7) 2.9 (2.9) 
 # of times hurt or in danger of being killed 6.0 (11.4) 6.7 (12.3) 6.4 (11.7) 
 # of times hit by someone with intent to hurt 7.3 (6.9) 9.1 (11.4) 8.1 (9.3) 
 # of times mugged 2.4 (2.9) 1.5 (1.5) 2.0 (2.3) 
 # of times attacked by a weapon or by     
someone with intent to kill 
2.5 (2.2) 2.3 (1.7) 2.4 (2.0) 
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Intervention Groups 
MORE. The ten-session, manualized MORE intervention was adapted as a 
treatment for alcohol dependence from Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy, an 
empirically-supported, mindfulness intervention designed to prevent depression relapse 
(Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002). MORE involves mindful breathing and walking 
meditations, as well as experiential exercises relating general mindfulness principles to 
addiction-specific issues such as relapse triggers, craving, thought suppression, stress, 
and unconscious substance use behaviors. A Master’s level social worker (MSW) with 
experience in mindfulness meditation who was trained in cognitive-behavioral treatments 
for substance dependence delivered the MORE intervention. 
ASG. To control for time, attention, credibility, and group process, the ten-session 
ASG condition consisted of MSW-led social support groups derived from the active, 
evidence-based treatment condition outlined in the Matrix Model intensive outpatient 
treatment manual (Rawson & McCann, 2006). These groups were led by a Master’s level 
social worker with comparable training in addictions treatment to that of the MORE 
clinician. Wherever possible, ASG topics were selected to roughly match corresponding 
themes of the MORE intervention. ASG participants were guided to disclose feelings and 
thoughts about group topics, as well as to provide advice and emotional support for their 
peers. Although the Master’s-level social worker facilitated discussion using client-
centered counseling skills (Rogers, 2003), no prescriptions for change were given.  
For fifteen minutes a day, MORE participants were asked to practice mindfulness 
exercises while ASG participants were asked to journal for 15 minutes per day on support 
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group topics. A brief session by session description of the study treatment groups is 
detailed in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Session-Specific Description of MORE and ASG Interventions 
Session MORE ASG 
1 Discussion of mindfulness and automatic 
drinking; mindfulness of craving; mindful 
breathing and body scan  
Discussion of triggers for alcohol 
dependence relapse 
2 Discussion of cognitive reappraisal; 
practice of mindful decentering and 
mindful breathing 
Discussion of justifications for relapse 
and using alcohol to mask one’s 
emotions 
3 Discussion of attentional re-orienting as 
means of coping with negative emotions 
and craving; mindful breathing; 
mindfulness of perceptions & sensations 
Discussion of how participants cope 
with emotions of anger and sadness 
4 Discussion of craving; practice of “urge 
surfing,” mindfulness of craving, and 
contemplation of negative consequences 
of drinking; imaginal alcohol cue-
exposure; mindful breathing practice 
Discussion of how participants cope 
with craving and managing 
compulsive behavior 
5 Discussion of the relationship of the stress 
response to craving; imaginal stress 
exposure; mindful breathing  
Discussion of stress and methods 
participants use to relax without 
alcohol 
6 Discussion of thought suppression, 
aversion, and attachment; exercise in the 
futility of thought suppression;  mindful 
breathing and acceptance 
Discussion of the attempt to maintain 
control and loss of control 
7 Discussion of the deleterious effects of 
alcohol on the body; mindful 
interoceptive awareness; mindful walking 
Discussion of physical health 
promotion and ways to recreate 
without alcohol  
8 Discussion of relational triggers for 
relapse; mindful communication; 
compassion meditation 
Discussion of codependence 
relationships and the challenge of 
forming friendships without alcohol 
9 Discussion of interdependence, meaning, 
and spirituality; meditation on 
interdependence; mindful breathing  
Discussion of spirituality 
10 Review; discussion of how to maintain 
mindfulness practice; development of 
mindful relapse prevention plan; imaginal 
rehearsal of mindful relapse prevention; 
mindful breathing  
Reflection on the support group 
experience; discussion of the recovery 
process  
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Design and Procedure 
All study procedures were approved by the University of North Carolina – Chapel 
Hill Institutional Review Board.  Participants were recruited when they had resided at 
least 18 months at the TC through an informational presentation about the study made at 
the TC, as well as through flyers and direct referrals from TC staff. Interested potential 
participants contacted the researchers by way of TC staff, were verbally consented for 
screening, and completed a 20 minute face-to-face eligibility screen. Screening 
procedures included administration of the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test 
(AUDIT) and a semi-structured diagnostic interview conducted by a Master’s-level social 
worker to ensure that all participants met lifetime DSM-IV criteria for alcohol 
dependence. Participants were excluded if they scored < 16 on the AUDIT, or if they 
endorsed screening questions indicating active psychosis (Degenhardt, Hall, Korten, & 
Jablensky, 2005) or suicidality. 
Following the informed consent protocol, eligible participants were scheduled for 
a pre-intervention assessment at the TC on a separate day. At completion of the 
assessment, participants were randomly assigned, using a computerized random number 
generator, to either ten weeks of MORE or ASG. No participants refused randomization. 
Participants received $25 for completion of each assessment and $5 for attending each 
intervention session, with a possible bonus of $25 for perfect attendance of all 
assessments and sessions. The maximum amount a study participant could earn was 
$175. 
Measures 
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Study participants completed standardized psychosocial instruments and a 
psychophysiological cue-reactivity protocol before and after 10 weeks of intervention, as 
well as a computer-based measurement of alcohol AB at pre-intervention, intervention 
midpoint (5 weeks), and post-intervention. Psychosocial instruments were verbally 
administered in interviews conducted by a research assistant who was blind to group 
assignment. All measures were administered in the same order across participants in a 
single session. A follow-up report will examine three-month outcomes when those data 
become available. 
Intervention credibility. Perceived credibility of the MORE and ASG 
interventions as treatments for alcohol dependence was assessed after session two using a 
scale (α = .83) based on the Attitudes Towards Treatment measure (Borkovec & Nau, 
1972) which assesses patients’ expectations of benefit once treatment has been explained. 
The scale has been found to distinguish between standard psychotherapy approaches and 
illogical placebo treatments, is predictive of clinical improvement, and relatively 
independent of symptom severity (Borkovec & Nau, 1972). 
Mindfulness. The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ, α = .81), 
comprised of 39 likert-type items, was used to measure self-reported mindfulness. The 
FFMQ yields a total score and scores for five internally consistent mindfulness factors 
each with their own convergent and predictive validity: nonreactivity to inner experience 
(tapped by items such as “I watch my feelings without getting lost in them”), observing 
and attending to experience (“I pay attention to sensations, such as the wind in my hair or 
the sun on my face”), describing and discriminating emotional experiences (“I’m good at 
finding words to describe my feelings”), nonjudging of experience (“I tell myself I 
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shouldn’t be feeling the way that I am feeling”), and acting with awareness (“I find 
myself doing things without paying attention”) (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & 
Toney, 2006). 
Psychosocial factors related to alcohol-dependence. The Brief Symptom 
Inventory (BSI, α = .96) was use to measure to what degree participants were currently 
distressed by psychiatric symptoms (Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983) on 5-point scale (0 = 
not at all, 4 = extremely). The 53 items include symptoms such as “Feeling fearful” and 
“Feelings of guilt.” Subjective alcohol craving was assessed with Penn Alcohol Craving 
Scale (PACS, α = .91) (Flannery et al., 2001). Participants use a 7-point scale to indicate 
craving frequency and intensity over the past week on items like “How often have you 
thought about drinking or about how good a drink would make you feel?” and “At its 
most severe point, how strong was your craving?” Self-reported ability to inhibit the urge 
to use alcohol was assessed with the Impaired Alcohol Response Inhibition Scale (IRISA, 
α = .79) (Guardia, Trujols, Burguete, Luquero, & Cardus, 2007). Participants indicate on 
a 4-point scale with 14 items how often over the past week they would agree with 
statements including “When I have decided not to drink, I find it easy not to” and “If I 
thought about the possibility of drinking I think I could have resisted.” The 10-item 
Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-10, α = .85) was used to assess on a 5-point scale how often 
(0 = never, 4 = very often) in the past month participants found their lives unpredictable, 
uncontrollable, and overwhelming (Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983), and 
includes items such as “How often have you felt nervous and ‘stressed’?” and “How 
often have you felt that you were on top of things?”. Chronic thought suppression, the 
maladaptive and counterproductive tendency to avoid or repress undesirable cognitions 
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and emotions, was assessed with the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI, α = .84) 
(Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). Participants indicate agreement on a 5-point scale with 15 
items, including “I always try to put problems out of mind” and “I often do things to 
distract myself from my thoughts.” 
Psychophysiological cue-reactivity. Due to our interest in the effects of stress on 
alcohol dependence, a cue-reactivity protocol was used to measure autonomic reactivity 
to and recovery from stress-primed alcohol cues. First, electrocardiogram (ECG) sensors 
in a lead II configuration were attached. ECG was sampled at 500 Hz and recorded 
continuously throughout the protocol on a Biopac MP150 data acquisition system 
(Biopac Systems, Goleta, CA). Once electrodes were attached, participants were asked to 
rate their current level of distress on a 10-point visual analogue scale (VAS) (0 = not at 
all, 9 = extremely). Next, participants were instructed to remain motionless, silent, and 
“not think about anything in particular” for a 5-minute baseline. After this baseline 
period, participants again rated their current distress to assess whether any initial 
reactivity elicited by the unfamiliar experimental context had stabilized after the 5-minute 
rest period. Next, 30 aversive photographs from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS) were displayed on a 15” laptop screen for 10 seconds each in succession 
(total duration: 5 min).  Participants were asked to fixate on the image stream while 
holding as still as possible. After this presentation, participants again rated their current 
level of distress. Next, 30 photographs of beer, wine, and distilled liquor (12 of which 
included individuals drinking or preparing to drink alcohol) were displayed for 10 
seconds each in succession (total duration: 5 min), and participants were again instructed 
to fixate on the image stream while holding as still as possible. At the end of the alcohol 
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cue exposure period, participants were asked to rate their current level of distress. Lastly, 
participants were instructed, “Remaining silent and keeping your body still, use whatever 
methods you have learned to cope with or reduce your craving” for a 5-minute recovery 
period, after which they again rated their current level of distress. A single qualitative 
question, “What methods did you use to cope?”, identified coping strategies used.  
Nevrokard aHRV (Medistar, Stegne, Ljubljana, Slovenia) was used to 
automatically detect and mark R-waves. The R-wave file was visually inspected to 
remove incorrectly identified R-waves (i.e., a movement artifact) or score R-waves that 
were missed by the automated detection. Kubios 2.0 (Biosignal Analysis and Medical 
Imaging Group, University of Finland) was used for time-domain analysis of R-R 
intervals. The square root of the mean squared differences between successive R-R 
intervals (RMSSD) was selected as our estimate of vagally mediated HRV. This analysis 
focused on a particular planned contrast: HRV recovery, that is, changes in HRV between 
alcohol cue exposure and the recovery period. 
Alcohol attentional bias. A dot probe task (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) 
created in E-Prime 1.2 (PST Inc., Pittsburgh, PA) and presented on an IBM T60 laptop 
with a 15” screen was used to measure alcohol AB. In each trial, two grayscale images 
appeared, one on each side of a fixation cross (+); one image was neutral in content, the 
other was alcohol-related. The pair of images were presented for either 200 ms or 2000 
ms. Left/right position of the alcohol images and presentation duration were both 
randomized and counterbalanced across 20 practice trials and 160 trials. Following a 50 
ms inter-stimulus interval (ISI), a target (two dots) replaced one of the images and a 
distracter probe (one dot) replaced the other image; probes appeared for 100ms. 
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Participants were instructed to fixate on the cross between the images and indicate the 
location of the target by responding with a left or right button press on a keypad. Target 
probes randomly replaced alcohol and neutral images with equal frequency.  
Some parameters of the task employed here vary slightly from tasks used 
previously to study addiction-related AB. Two notable differences are: (1) the fixation 
point remains on the screen throughout the duration of each trial, and (2) dots appear in 
both probe locations, requiring participants to discriminate between the location with one 
dot and the location with 2 dots.  This task design was chosen to eliminate confounding 
contributions of automatic, reflexive attention that are not related to the image cues. In 
particular, both sudden onsets and offsets have been found to capture attention 
(Hopfinger & Maxwell, 2005), and the sudden offset of the fixation cross, or the sudden 
onset of a target at only one location, could interfere with any spatial shift in attention 
caused by the pictorial cues, especially in trials with the short (200ms) stimulus onset 
asynchrony (SOA). More specifically, if the fixation cross were to disappear when the 
dot probes appeared, attention would likely be drawn to the middle of the screen reducing 
the power to detect attentional allocation shifts due to the alcohol image cues. 
Additionally, if a target appeared in only one location, participants’ attention would be 
reflexively captured by the target. Including a place marker in the opposite target 
location, requires the participant’s attention to be directed to the spatial location of the 
target and ensures that response selection cannot be based on detection of the probe 
through peripheral vision. Moreover, the use of two probes requires greater attentional 
resources than detection of a single probe and thus this design may have more power to 
resolve attentional shifts induced by the alcohol cues. 
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Alcohol stimuli included 13 photographs of alcoholic drinks (liquor, beer, etc), as 
well as 7 photos of persons drinking alcohol. Neutral stimuli included 13 photos of 
kitchen items and 7 photos of persons in kitchen scenes. Stimulus sets were analyzed 
with respect to their spatial frequency content to ensure that they did not differ in terms of 
basic visual properties, which could elicit reflexive attentional capture irrespective of 
image content. On measures of both the spectral peak (Neutral: 0.0180, Alcohol: 0.0176, 
t(38)=0.383, p=0.704) and spectral width (Neutral: 59.20, Alcohol: 59.29, t(38)=-0.027, 
p=0.979), the two stimulus sets were not significantly different. 
Data analysis 
Data were examined for outliers and to ensure they met distributional assumptions 
for normality. All outcome variables were approximately normally distributed, save for 
heart rate variability data (RMSSD) which was skewed and therefore log-transformed 
(log10). Bivariate correlations, t-tests, chi-square tests, and repeated-measures analyses of 
variance (ANOVA) were used to test hypotheses, compare group differences at baseline 
and over time, and explore individual differences in the change process.   
For AB data, trials with extreme RTs, defined as those with RTs longer than +3 
SD above the individual mean (c.f., Field et al., 2004), were discarded as outliers (mean = 
2.5±1.5 per  participant); error trials were also discarded. For each participant, AB scores 
were calculated by subtracting their mean RT to probes replacing alcohol photos from 
their mean RT to probes replacing neutral photos, such that positive bias scores indicate 
an AB toward visual alcohol cues. All data are reported as means ± SD unless otherwise 
noted. 
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RESULTS 
Pre-intervention Group Differences 
 There were no significant pre-intervention differences between MORE and ASG 
participants on age, gender, race, income, number of months residing in the TC, alcohol 
dependence criteria, AUDIT, DAST, exposure to traumatic violence, craving, impaired 
alcohol response inhibition, psychiatric symptoms, mindfulness, thought suppression, or 
alcohol attentional bias. Similarly, there were no significant differences between MORE 
and ASG participants in HRV responses during the pre-intervention cue-reactivity 
protocol. The only difference approaching statistical significance (p = .094) was for 
number of drinks/day, such that participants randomized to MORE had marginally higher 
levels of alcohol consumption before entering the TC than those randomized to ASG. 
Similarly, there were no significant differences between intervention completers and drop 
outs on any of the variables listed above. In addition, there was no significant difference 
in intervention credibility between MORE (M = 39.4, SD = 6.4) and ASG participants (M 
= 40.6, SD = 4.7), F(1, 41) = .497, p = .485. 
Intervention Compliance and Attrition 
 Approximately 69% (N = 37; MORE = 18, ASG = 19) of the total enrolled 
sample (N = 53) completed post-intervention assessments. Attrition did not significantly 
differ by intervention group. Similarly, the difference in attendance between the groups 
was nonsignificant. On average, MORE participants completed 8.0 (SD = 2.1) sessions, 
whereas ASG participants completed 7.3 (SD = 3.5) sessions. 
Outcomes 
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Table 6. Means (SD) in Clinical and Attentional Variables 
 Means 
Variables Pre Post 
Perceived stress   
  MORE (n=18) 15.6 (4.7) 10.8 (5.3) 
  ASG (n=19) 16.0 (7.6) 14.5 (5.8) 
Thought suppression   
  MORE (n=18) 53.6 (8.7) 50.1 (7.9) 
  ASG (n=19) 50.9 (11.2) 53.5 (9.4) 
Mindfulness   
  MORE (n=17) 108.3 (12.3) 109.8 (14.6) 
  ASG (n=19) 115.9 (15.1) 118.3 (17.9) 
Craving    
  MORE (n=18) 4.7 (5.5) 4.6 (5.3) 
  ASG (n=19) 4.9 (4.4) 3.2 (3.6) 
Impaired alcohol response inhibition   
  MORE (n=18) 7.8 (5.5) 4.9 (4.9) 
  ASG (n=18) 6.2 (4.9) 5.3 (4.2) 
Global psychiatric symptoms   
  MORE (n=18) 42.7 (36.4) 19.6 (12.5) 
  ASG (n=19) 46.7 (33.0) 31.8 (21.4) 
 Pre Mid Post 
200ms approach AB    
  MORE (n=9) 7.2 (6.9) 10.7 (13.9) 2.9 (21.9) 
  ASG (n=9) 13.5 (8.2) -9.0 (19.9) 17.6 (17.2) 
2000ms approach AB    
  MORE (n=7) 12.6 (12.1) 3.6 (23.7) 2.3 (21.9) 
  ASG (n=7) 12.9 (9.1) -12.8 (10.9) 1.7 (10.4) 
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Table 6 summarizes changes in clinical and attentional variables over the course 
of both the MORE and ASG interventions. 
Intervention effects on self-report measures. Both MORE and ASG led to 
significant reductions in perceived stress over time, F(1, 35) = 18.11, p < .001, ηρ2 = .34. 
Moreover, there was a significant intervention X time interaction on perceived stress, 
F(1, 35) = 5.06, p = .03, ηρ2 = .13, such that MORE led to significantly larger decreases 
in perceived stress over a 10-week period than ASG (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Intervention group differences in perceived stress at baseline and 10-weeks 
post-intervention 
 
 
 
Although there were no main effects of time on thought suppression, there was a 
significant intervention X time interaction on thought suppression, F(1, 35) = 4.26, p = 
.04, ηρ2 = .11, such that MORE led to significant decreases in thought suppression over 
a-10 week period, whereas an ASG led to increased thought suppression (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Intervention group differences in thought suppression at baseline and 10-weeks 
post-intervention. 
 
 Conversely, while there was a main effect of time on psychiatric symptoms, F(1, 
35) = 10.83, p = .002, ηρ2 = .24, there was no significant intervention X time interaction 
on psychiatric symptoms; both MORE and ASG led to significant decreases in global 
psychiatric symptoms over time 
With regard to self-reported mindfulness, there was neither a main effect nor a 
intervention X time interaction effect on the total scale and subscale scores. Similarly, 
there was an absence of both main and interaction effects on craving and impaired 
alcohol response inhibition, suggesting that both interventions had negligible effects on 
alcohol urges and neither reduced craving more than the other. 
Intervention effects on alcohol attentional bias. Despite that both 2000 and 200 
ms AB data were approximately normally distributed (both yielding non-significant 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for normality), approximately one-half of participants 
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exhibited 2000 and 200 ms AB towards probes replacing alcohol photos while the other 
half exhibited AB towards probes replacing neutral photos. Given that AB towards 
alcohol cues is theorized to represent appetitive conditioning (Field & Cox, 2008) while 
AB away from alcohol cues is thought to represent disengagement from or avoidance of 
the substance (Townshend & Duka, 2007), we analyzed data from participants with these 
two apparently distinct types of AB separately. Thus, for each presentation duration 
(2000 ms and 200 ms) we divided participants into two groups: those with an AB > 0, 
i.e., the 200 ms (N = 18) and 2000 ms (N = 15) alcohol approach groups, and those with 
an AB < 0, i.e., the 200 ms (N = 19) and 2000 ms (N = 21) alcohol disengagement 
groups.  
Among the 200ms alcohol approach bias group, there was a significant 
intervention X time interaction on 200 ms AB, F(2, 32) = 4.76, p = .03, ηρ2 = .23, using a 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction due to violations of sphericity (See Figure 4). Within-
subjects contrasts revealed a significant quadratic form to the intervention X time 
interaction, F(1, 16) = 8.09, p = .01. Repeated contrasts were used to clarify the group X 
time interaction. These indicated that when baseline 200 ms AB was compared with 
midpoint 200 ms AB, there was a significant group X time interaction, F(1, 16) = 11.85, 
p = .003, ηρ2= .43. When midpoint 200 ms AB was compared with post-intervention 200 
ms AB, there was also a significant group X time interaction, F(1, 16) = 5.18, p = .04. 
For the 2000ms alcohol approach bias group, although there was a significant main effect 
for time such that the AB decreased over the course of both interventions, F(2, 12) = 
4.54, p = .02, there was no significant intervention X time effect. 
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Figure 4. Intervention group differences in 200 ms AB at baseline, 5-week intervention 
midpoint, and 10-weeks post-intervention for participants with alcohol approach 
attentional bias. 
 
 
Intervention effects on heart rate variability responses to stress-primed alcohol 
cues. To examine the effects of stress-primed alcohol cues on HRV, we controlled for 
severity of alcohol dependence by covarying number of drinks consumed a day prior to 
entering the TC. We also covaried post-intervention level of perceived stress to examine 
the effects of the experimental stress-primed alcohol cue exposure protocol on HRV 
above and beyond the HRV effects of tonic levels of stress. Although the overall F-test 
for the intervention X experimental condition (baseline, stress exposure, alcohol 
exposure, recovery) interaction was nonsignificant, there was a significant intervention X 
condition interaction on the planned contrast between alcohol cue exposure and the 
recovery period, F(1,30) = 5.30, p = .03, ηρ2 = .15, indicating that the pattern of RSA 
from alcohol cue exposure to recovery varied as a function of intervention (see Figure 5). 
No such significant intervention X condition effect on HRV was found during the 
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baseline assessment after covarying prior level of alcohol consumption and pre-
intervention perceived stress, lending support to the interpretation that the observed post-
intervention between-groups differences in HRV recovery were the result of the MORE 
and ASG interventions.  
Qualitative inquiry indicated that during the post-intervention cue-reactivity 
protocol, all MORE participants practiced mindfulness meditation during the recovery 
period while the most common strategies used by ASG participants included cognitive 
reappraisal (e.g., focus on the negative consequences of drinking and the positive benefits 
of sobriety) as well as suppression (e.g., tried to think about something else). With regard 
to subjective distress during the cue-reactivity protocol, after controlling for prior level of 
alcohol consumption and tonic post-intervention perceived stress, MORE participants had 
significantly larger reductions in distress from alcohol cue-exposure to the recovery 
period, F(1,32) = 4.94, p = .03, ηρ2 = .13. 
 
Figure 5. Intervention group differences in post-treatment HRV (RMSSD, log10)* during 
stress-primed alcohol cue-reactivity protocol. 
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Individual difference variables and changes in stress and addiction-related 
factors. To determine whether improvements in self-reported ability to inhibit alcohol 
responses were associated with individual differences in baseline stress, changes in 
impaired alcohol response inhibition were correlated with pre-intervention perceived 
stress. Among mindfulness participants, the greatest improvements in self-reported 
ability to inhibit alcohol responses were found among those with highest baseline levels 
of perceived stress, r = .52, p = .03. Among support group participants, there was no 
significant correlation between these variables, indicating that the relationship between 
high baseline stress and improvements in the ability to inhibit alcohol responses may be 
attributable to the MORE intervention. Thus, it appears that MORE is most effective at 
inhibiting the appetitive alcohol responses of persons who experience high levels of stress 
at baseline, i.e. persons who may be more likely to drink as a means of coping with 
stress. 
Importantly, among MORE participants, changes in thought suppression were 
correlated with changes in AB200 (r = .49, p = .042), changes in impaired alcohol 
response inhibition (r = .48, p = .045), and changes in post-intervention HRV recovery, (r 
= .49, p = .045). MORE participants who experienced the larger decreases in thought 
suppression over the course of intervention also evidenced the larger decreases in AB200 
and impaired alcohol response inhibition while evincing the greater HRV recovery. 
However, among ASG participants, there was no significant correlation between these 
variables, suggesting that the associations between change in thought suppression, 200ms 
AB, impaired alcohol response inhibition, and HRV may be attributable to the MORE 
intervention.  In contrast, across the entire sample of persons who completed either 
95 
 
MORE or ASG intervention, greater decreases in stress were significantly correlated with 
larger decreases in impaired alcohol response inhibition (r = .33, p = .046), suggesting 
that regardless of the nature of the intervention, persons who experienced the largest 
reductions in stress over the course of intervention reported the greatest improvements in 
their ability to inhibit appetitive alcohol responses, and vice versa.  
DISCUSSION 
Results suggest that training in mindfulness may affect cognitive-affective risk 
mechanisms implicated in alcohol dependence relapse. Mindfulness training appeared to 
reduce stress and thought suppression to a significantly greater extent than an evidence-
based active control intervention. Notably, mindfulness training seems to decrease the 
200ms AB, an implicit cognitive process linked with alcohol dependence. In addition, 
MORE appears to be a feasible intervention for the prevention of stress-precipitated 
alcohol relapse based on the high perceived treatment credibility and acceptable 
attendance rates in this study, as well as absence of significant differences in attrition 
from an ASG, a commonly accepted standard of care. This finding of feasibility is 
notable given the low income and otherwise high risk nature of the study sample. 
Importantly, MORE reduced perceived stress to a greater extent that ASG, which 
is noteworthy given that social support has been shown reduce stress reactivity and buffer 
deleterious effects of stressful life events (Christenfeld & Gerin, 2000; Kamarck, 
Manuck, & Jennings, 1990). The stress reduction effects of mindfulness training among 
nonclinical populations are well known in the literature (Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, 
& Walach, 2004), but it is noteworthy that significant effects were obtained in a sample 
of clinically-disordered, alcohol-dependent adults with extensive trauma histories who 
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may be more vulnerable due to allostatic dysregulation of neural stress circuitry (Valdez 
& Koob, 2004) . Among recovering alcohol-dependent individuals, mindfulness training 
appears to be a potentially effective stress reduction technique and therefore may be a 
useful component in the prevention of stress-precipitated relapse. Hypothetically, the 
stress-reduction effects of mindfulness training among recovering addicts may be 
mediated by the regulation of corticotrophin releasing factor and neuropeptide Y systems 
that had been dysregulated in the transition to alcohol dependence. Research by Marcus 
and colleagues (2003) demonstrating mindfulness-induced attenuation of waking salivary 
cortisol levels in alcohol- and drug-dependent individuals lends support to this 
hypothesis, but more work is needed to clarify the mechanisms of mindfulness’ stress-
reduction effect in this population. 
Like stress, thought suppression significantly decreased over the course of ten 
weeks of mindfulness training. In turn, decreases in thought suppression among MORE 
participants were significantly correlated with decreases in impaired alcohol response 
inhibition, which suggests that for those participants who improved their ability to 
regulate drinking urges, they may have done so via reductions in thought suppression. 
This finding partially replicates results reported by Bowen et al. (2007) within the context 
of our randomized controlled design, although limitations of statistical power in the 
present study preclude replication of their tests for mediation. Thought suppression 
appears to play a substantial role in psychopathology (Purdon, 1999), by increasing the 
rate, intensity, and accessibility of the very thoughts and moods it is directed against 
(Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987), as well as intensifying sympathetic nervous 
system activity (Gross, 2002; Gross & Levenson, 1993; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). In 
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the context of alcohol dependence, thought suppression seems to enhance the availability 
of alcohol-related cognitions and affective reactions to consciousness. MORE, with its 
emphasis on nonjudgmental, metacognitive awareness of present-moment experience, 
appeared to counter this deleterious cognitive strategy and therefore may have prevented 
post-suppression rebound effects from exacerbating negative affect and intrusive alcohol-
related cognitions that could have otherwise led to relapse. Conversely, participants in the 
alcohol-dependence support group may have professed invulnerability to alcohol urges 
for the purposes of social conformity and maintaining an appearance of competence, 
thereby leading to the increased thought suppression observed in the ASG data. This 
behavior seems to parallel the willful hubris denounced in 12-step fellowships, which 
exhort the person in recovery to admit their powerlessness over addiction perhaps as a 
means of disrupting the paradoxical effects of urge suppression. 
Contrary to our hypotheses, MORE did not lead to significant increases in self-
reported mindfulness, nor did it result in significant decrements in craving. This 
counterintuitive finding may be explained by the nature of the participants and the 
mindfulness training itself. Prior to mindfulness training, the alcohol-dependent 
individuals sampled in this study may have overestimated their level of mindfulness due 
to their lack of understanding of the construct and their general lack of self-awareness, 
which was one of the intended targets of mindfulness training itself. After ten weeks of 
mindfulness practice reflecting on their own internal experience, MORE participants may 
have had a greater sense of the meaning of the FFMQ questions, and having encountered 
numerous challenges in their attempts to embody the principles of nonreactivity, 
nonjudgment, acting with awareness, etc., may have been able to more accurately 
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appraise their level of mindfulness. Similarly, the alcohol-dependent study participants 
residing in a therapeutic community where access and exposure to alcohol was limited 
may have lacked awareness of the extent to which they continued to have drinking urges, 
leading to an underreporting of craving at baseline. This lack of awareness of alcohol 
reactivity that has been shown to be predictive of future relapse (Rohsenow et al., 1994). 
Because MORE was, in part, designed to increase consciousness of craving and decrease 
urge suppression, ten weeks of the intervention may have heightened awareness of latent 
alcohol urges, thus resulting in an apparent lack of change in craving over time. Of 
course, such interpretations are speculative, and a number of alternative interpretations 
are possible, such as inaccurate reporting due to social desirability bias, ceiling/floor 
effects due to previous participation in a therapeutic community, and the possibility of 
true null effects of MORE on mindfulness and craving. 
Both interventions led to statistically significant reductions in psychiatric 
symptoms. The fact that ASG exerted a treatment effect comparable to that of MORE 
indicates that the control condition used in this study was therapeutically active. This 
finding bolsters the body of research on the clinical utility of social support groups for the 
treatment of psychological problems (Dean & Lin, 1977; Laudet, Magura, Vogel, & 
Knight, 2000), as well as replicating the findings of Bowen et al. (2006) that mindfulness 
training decreases psychiatric symptoms among substance abusers. However, given that 
no significant differences were found between intervention conditions, it cannot be ruled 
out that the reductions in psychiatric symptoms observed were due to placebo effects. 
In contrast, MORE and ASG had differential effects on HRV during a stress-
primed alcohol cue-reactivity paradigm. Although there were no significant differences at 
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baseline, after 10 weeks of intervention, MORE participants, relative to ASG 
participants, exhibited high HRV during alcohol cue exposure which then decreased as 
they practiced mindfulness meditation. The pattern observed among MORE participants 
may be interpreted as evidence of engagement of emotion regulation processes during 
alcohol cue exposure followed by disengagement of cognitive resources from alcohol-
related cognitions and cravings during the recovery period.  
Greater HRV is linked to greater prefrontal inhibition of stress-induced 
sympathetic nervous system activation (Thayer & Lane, 2009). However, lower HRV 
may be related to decreased parasympathetic efference associated with focused, 
concentrated attention on the breath, as well as the rhythmic pacing of the breath that may 
stem from novice meditation techniques of breath focus and counting (Peressutti, Martin-
Gonzalez, J, & Mesa, 2009). These techniques may work as a rhythmic stimulus that 
entrains the breath and reduces overall HRV. While highly experienced meditators, who 
describe the phenomenology of meditation as an effortless opening of awareness, may 
show increased HRV during mindfulness practice, novice meditators, who use primarily 
concentration meditation with the breath as the object of focus, exhibit decreased HRV 
during meditation practice (Peressutti et al., 2009). 
This interpretation is consistent with findings of suppressed HRV during working 
memory and sustained attention tasks (Hansen, Johnsen, & Thayer, 2003). As Thayer and 
Lane (2000) assert in their neurovisceral integration model, “sustained attention is 
associated with vigilance and the suppression of HRV. The appropriate short-term 
suppression of HRV and the associated focusing of attention are important for effective 
self-regulation” (p. 207). For novices, meditation on the breath is effortful, and the 
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cognitive load and working memory demands inherent in intense attentional focus may 
lead to phasic vagal withdrawal from the heart.  
Other converging evidence supports our interpretation. Indeed, the neurovisceral 
integration model (Thayer & Lane, 2000) posits that as CAN (central autonomic 
network) activity increases HRV increases, leading to increased braking activity on the 
heart. Thus, HRV should increase proportionally to the intensity of conscious processing 
of emotion and emotion regulation. Indeed, relative to ASG participants, MORE 
participants had higher post-intervention HRV during stress and alcohol cue exposure 
(despite having lower pre-intervention levels of HRV), perhaps indicative of marshalling 
greater cognitive control in service of regulating negative emotions triggered by aversive 
images and cravings elicited by alcohol cues. In contrast, the post-intervention ASG 
group evidenced phasic suppression of HRV during stress and alcohol cue exposure, a 
pattern that seems to indicate disruption of homeostasis, anxiety, and stress reactivity 
(Thayer & Lane, 2000). 
Germane to this discussion are findings that high self-regulation efforts to resist 
temptation result in increased HRV (Segerstrom & Nes, 2007), and alcoholics who 
reported having a greater ability to regulate alcohol urges experienced increased HRV 
when exposed to alcohol cues relative to those who were reportedly less able to regulate 
alcohol-use compulsions (Ingjaldsson et al., 2003). In fact, Ingjaldsson et al. (2003) 
reported that high compulsive drinkers experienced a nonsignificant decrease in HRV 
from baseline to alcohol cue exposure. This differential pattern is similar to the pattern 
observed in our own data, where the response of MORE participants to alcohol cue 
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exposure parallels that of the low compulsive drinkers and the response of ASG 
participants parallels that of high compulsive drinkers.  
After alcohol cue exposure, when emotion-regulatory efforts were no longer 
needed, MORE participants may have experienced vagal withdrawal leading to decreased 
HRV during the recovery period. During this period MORE participants may have shifted 
their attentional focus onto the breath, resulting in a state of cognitive simplicity that 
requires effortful engagement of working memory to maintain, thus, leading to 
suppressed HRV and increased HR. In contrast, ASG participants used emotion 
regulation strategies such as reappraisal and suppression during the recovery period. 
These strategies may have required a high level of PFC engagement, thus leading to the 
increased HRV observed among ASG participants during the recovery period, an 
interpretation supported research showing increased HRV during reappraisal and 
suppression (Butler, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2006). Hypothetically, this pattern of cardiac 
response may indicate the superior efficiency of mindfulness as an emotion regulation 
strategy relative to reappraisal, distraction, and suppression strategies, an inference 
supported by our self-report data that show that MORE led to greater reductions in 
subjective distress from alcohol cue-exposure to recovery.  
 Importantly, among MORE participants but not among ASG participants, larger 
pre-post reductions in thought suppression were correlated with greater post-intervention 
HRV recovery from alcohol cue exposure. Hence, we can speculate that those MORE 
participants who most successfully learned to employ mindful awareness of alcohol-
related cognitions and craving were able to disengage from those mental phenomena 
more efficiently, as reflected by increased HRV recovery. In contrast, alcohol dependent 
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persons who continued to use thought suppression as a strategy may have remained 
fixated on alcohol-related cognitions and cues due to the post-suppression rebound effect, 
resulting in less HRV recovery which may be reflective of continued ruminative 
engagement (Key, Campbell, Bacon, & Gerin, 2008). 
Intervention effects on 200 ms alcohol AB may also index degree of 
disengagement from alcohol-related cognitions. Given that mindfulness training has been 
shown to impact attentional orienting and alerting processes (Jha et al., 2007), we 
hypothesized that MORE would impact 200ms AB in persons with alcohol approach 
biases at baseline. Although this hypothesis was supported by the data, we expected a 
simple decreasing linear change trajectory and not the apparently u-shaped, quadratic 
pattern observed. What could account for the pattern of results seen in the AB data? 
During the first five weeks of the MORE intervention, participants were encouraged to 
decenter from their cognitive-emotional experience and become aware of whatever 
thoughts and feelings arose during the meditation sessions. Several mindfulness exercises 
involved imaginal alcohol exposure in order to teach methods to deal mindfully with 
craving. During these exercises, participants were encouraged to imagine having strong 
alcohol cravings and to notice the resultant physiological and affective reactivity. In 
addition, participants were asked to log daily experiences of craving and to carefully 
attend to the psychophysiological concomitants of the craving experience. Participation 
in these exercises may have activated alcohol use action schema, triggering implicit 
positive alcohol expectancies through the imagination of conditioned, hedonic stimuli, 
resulting in the deployment of a conditioned attentional response, i.e. increases in the 200 
ms AB. As the mindfulness participants became more proficient at self-regulating 
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attention and developing metacognitive awareness of automatic response patterns, this 
effect may have been attenuated by the post-intervention time point. 
Conversely, by five weeks into the alcohol support group intervention, 
participants may have felt considerable pressure to conform to the culture of the group, 
which emphasized an abstinence-only attitude toward recovery from alcohol dependence. 
Group culture focused on the negative consequences of drinking, and the climate of the 
group was such that verbal pronouncements of one’s ability to resist the temptation to 
drink were reinforced. These discussions may have activated negative implicit alcohol 
expectancies and therefore attenuated the 200 ms AB. However, as social bonds 
increased throughout the latter half of the group, participants may have become more 
comfortable disclosing their “weaknesses” to their peers, and were more apt to admit and 
discuss cravings for alcohol. This may have led to the triggering of positive implicit 
alcohol expectancies, and without exercising the metacognitive deautomatization 
afforded by the mindfulness training, such triggering may have led to increased 200 ms 
AB. 
What is the clinical significance of a small yet statistically significant change in 
200 ms AB over time among alcohol dependent MORE participants with baseline 
approach biases? To answer this question, post-intervention craving was regressed onto 
pre-post change in 200 ms AB for MORE participants with alcohol approach biases (N = 
9). Pre-post change in 200 ms AB significantly predicted post-intervention craving, β = 
.79, p = .01, R-squared = .62. Similarly, among MORE participants with baseline 200 ms 
approach bias, post-intervention 200 ms AB was significantly negatively correlated with 
post-intervention craving, r = -.72, p = .03. The finding that decreases in 200 ms AB over 
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the course of mindfulness intervention predicted higher craving at the end of the 
intervention is counterintuitive, as is the finding that smaller 200 ms AB is associated 
with higher subjective craving. 
However, when this seemingly paradoxical finding is viewed from the lens of 
Tiffany’s Cognitive Processing Model of Addiction, a coherent interpretation emerges. 
Tiffany (1990) posited that conscious craving was the result of the inhibition of 
automatized alcohol use action schema. The 200 ms AB has been considered an 
automatic, unconscious bias in initial attentional orienting towards alcohol-related stimuli 
(Field & Cox, 2008). Stimuli presented for 200 ms are too fast for conscious deployment 
of attention, and thus, initial orienting to such stimuli may be driven by implicit 
appetitive processes that can detect and operate on nonconscious stimuli. According to 
Tiffany’s theory, when alcohol use action schemas operate in an unobstructed fashion, 
there is an absence of craving. However, when an alcohol dependent individual interrupts 
the automatic, appetitive cognitive-behavioral responses that subserve his or her 
addiction, the resultant negative affective state of craving arises.  
Training in mindfulness meditation may lead to disruption of automatized 
behavior patterns. Deikman (1966) conceptualized the effect of meditation as a form of 
“deautomatization,” that is, an undoing of automatization whereby unconscious, habitual 
patterns of perception and motor behavior are reinvested with attention. It is plausible 
that during the course of the MORE intervention, automatized alcohol use action schema 
were deautomatized through formal and informal mindfulness practices, which involve 
the intentional and conscious direction of attention to cognitions, emotions, physiology, 
and behavior. Given that such conscious attentional processing disrupts automatic 
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processing (Lieberman, 2003), mindfulness training may have interrupted alcohol use 
action schema, which Tiffany’s (1990) theory would predict to result in an increase in 
conscious craving. In accord with this prediction, data from the present study show that 
decreases in 200 ms AB, an automatic orienting of attention towards alcohol cues, 
significantly predicted higher levels of craving among mindfulness participants in the 
baseline 200 ms alcohol approach bias group. 
This finding also is sensible in the context of the findings of Rohsenow and 
colleagues (1994), who found that greater awareness of physiological reactivity during 
alcohol exposure predicted decreased drinking among alcohol dependent men at three 
months post-intervention. If mindfulness training disrupts automatic processing of 
alcohol cues, leading to increased awareness of craving, this effect may indeed be 
salutary. By Tiffany’s (1990) account, craving is the result of an inhibition of appetitive 
tendencies. Thus, greater awareness of craving-related reactivity may indicate that 
automatic addictive patterns have been disrupted, which might eventuate in decreased 
drinking over time. In fact, this was one of Rohsenow et al.’s interpretations of their 
finding: “greater attention to drinking related stimuli or responses may result in greater 
extinction of conditioned reactions” (1994, p. 624). It should be noted that the form of 
attention mentioned in this quotation is conscious attention, i.e., maintenance or re-
orienting of attention and not the unconscious initial orienting indexed by the 200 ms AB. 
In further support of Tiffany’s contention that cravings are not necessary for the 
instigation of substance use, Rohsenow and colleagues (1994) found that urge to drink 
did not significantly predict post-intervention alcohol consumption. 
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The identified effects of MORE on thought suppression also support a 
deautomatization interpretation of the correlation between mindfulness-induced 
reductions in 200 ms AB and higher post-intervention craving, and notably, among 
MORE participants, reductions in thought suppression were significantly correlated with 
decreases in 200 ms AB. Over time, mindfulness training may reduce the tendency to 
suppress one’s thoughts and feelings, thereby allowing cravings that had been previously 
suppressed to surface to consciousness. In so doing, automatic appetitive schema 
(indexed by 200 ms AB) which may have been operating unchecked by controlled 
cognitive processing during active suppression may become accessible to explicit 
cognitive control. Thus, as thought suppression decreases, controlled cognitive 
processing can be more effectively deployed to inhibit and counter appetitive responding 
(as evidenced by the significant correlation between decreases in thought suppression and 
decreases in impaired alcohol response inhibition), resulting in decreased attentional 
capture by alcohol cues coupled with the conscious experience of craving as alcohol use 
action schema are disrupted. Through mindfulness, alcohol urges can be attended to in a 
nonreactive, nonjudgmental fashion, obviating the need for suppression. In so doing, 
cravings may extinguish over time, instead of intensifying as a result of suppression 
attempts. 
Alternatively, the counterintuitive relationship between decreased 200 ms AB and 
increased craving may be explained by the methodological issues that plague self-report 
measures of craving, such as lack of consensus on the operationalization of the construct, 
the temporal scope of the craving measurement, and inconsistency between psychological 
and physiological indices of craving (Monti, Rohsenow, & Hutchison, 2000; Tiffany, 
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Carter, & Singleton, 2000). If awareness of craving increased after ten weeks of 
mindfulness training, differences in pre-post craving scores may be biased, leading to 
spurious correlations between change in craving and 200 ms AB. In contrast, 
performance on a dot probe task with alcohol stimuli presented for 200 ms latencies may 
be a more valid indicator of appetitive tendencies towards alcohol than self-reports of 
craving. 
In sum, the unwitting attempts of recovering alcohol dependent persons to 
suppress appetitive cognitive-emotional reactions towards alcohol may obscure these 
responses from consciousness only to perpetuate and intensify them within the cognitive 
unconscious. In the domain of unconscious mental life, automatic processes run smoothly 
and efficiently uninhibited by volitional control (Kihlstrom, 1987). Hence, by shunting 
appetitive reactions into the unconscious, the alcohol dependent individual may increase 
the very appetitive response towards alcohol he or she is trying to suppress and/or 
exacerbate psychophysiological reactivity. Mindfulness training may serve to undo the 
process of making conscious responses unconscious. Thus, practice of mindfulness may 
promote the recovery of alcohol dependent persons through: a) deautomatization of 
alcohol use action schema, resulting in diminished attentional bias towards subliminal 
alcohol cues and increased craving as a result of disrupted automaticity; and b) decreased 
thought suppression resulting in increased awareness of alcohol urges over time, 
increased HRV recovery from alcohol cue-exposure, and improved ability to inhibit 
appetitive responses. 
The primary limitation of this study is its small sample size, which limits 
statistical power and generalizability of the findings. Generalizability of study findings 
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may also be limited by the sample selection and the absence of random sampling - 
participants who had resided for at least 18 months in a TC self-selected into the study, 
and thus had been exposed to a therapeutic milieu for an unusually long length of time 
relative to a 28-day residential or intensive outpatient treatment format. Due to the 
probable high motivation and competence of participants who had successfully 
maintained sobriety for over 18 months while residing in the TC, MORE and ASG may 
have had greater salutary effects in this sample than in persons with less commitment or 
ability to change. Conversely, because persons who could not maintain sobriety for a 
substantial length of time (i.e., those who were most severely impaired or dependent) 
were not included in this study, intervention effects may have been underestimated for 
individuals who might have shown the greatest benefit from MORE or ASG. Self-report 
measures were administered during face-to-face interviews, which may have led to social 
desirability bias in self-reported outcomes. Our interpretations of HRV data may be 
confounded because we were unable to control for the effects of respiration (Grossman & 
Taylor, 2007), although there is ample debate in the literature regarding the need for such 
corrections (e.g., Denver, Reed, & Porges, 2007). Given the presence of counterintuitive 
findings, this study needs to be replicated with a larger and more broadly representative 
sample, and additional research is needed to explore the clinical significance of the effect 
of mindfulness training on stress, thought suppression, HRV, and alcohol attentional bias. 
To that end, we are collecting follow-up data and intend to examine how intervention-
related changes in these cognitive, affective, and physiological variables predict alcohol 
relapse in a subsequent paper.  
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Despite evidence suggesting that stress appraisal and attentional biases are key 
components of alcohol dependence, the form of addictions treatment most available to 
poor and marginalized persons, social support groups, does not target these pathogenic 
mechanisms directly. In contrast, practice of mindfulness may attenuate stress reactivity 
and thought suppression while disrupting addictive automaticity, resulting in increased 
awareness of craving and greater ability to cope with alcohol urges in stressful contexts. 
Hence, mindfulness training may hold promise as an alternative, targeted treatment for 
stress-precipitated alcohol dependence among vulnerable members of society.   
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 INTEGRATIVE SUMMARY 
 
The convergence of theory, cross-sectional data, and clinical-experimental 
evidence detailed in this series of papers offers insights into the nature of stress-
precipitated alcohol dependence and its treatment. Stress reactivity, implicit cognition, 
and emotional suppression appear to be key intervening mechanisms between the 
experience of stressful life events and the compulsive use of alcohol. Targeting the links 
between these processes may unhinge alcohol misuse and dependence, and prevent 
relapse. The construct of mindfulness may be an important consideration in treatment and 
prevention efforts. 
 What is the relationship between mindfulness and stress-precipitated alcohol 
dependence? To answer this question, we must organize the often complementary and 
sometimes incongruent findings of this work. Theory and past research suggests a 
number of pathways through which mindfulness, as a self-regulatory strategy, may 
disrupt alcohol dependence: emotion-regulation, decentering from perseverative 
cognition, deautomatization of alcohol use action schema, attentional disengagement 
from alcohol cues, awareness of craving, and cue-exposure without suppressing alcohol 
urges. Our present work has found evidence for a number of these therapeutic 
mechanisms. 
 Among recovering alcohol dependent adults, trait-level mindfulness was inversely 
correlated with stress, thought suppression, and attentional fixation on alcohol cues. 
Thus, persons endorsing higher levels of mindfulness exhibited lower levels of risk 
factors associated with alcohol dependence. In this manner, high levels of trait 
117 
 
mindfulness may reflect self-regulatory competence, and thus persons reporting higher 
levels of mindfulness may be less susceptible to relapse. It should be noted that the 
sample of alcohol dependent persons in this investigation were not treatment naïve; thus, 
levels of mindfulness reported by participants may reflect both dispositional tendencies 
towards mindfulness and the salutary effects of long-term residence in a therapeutic 
community, which may impart attitudes of nonjudgment, nonreactivity, emotional 
awareness, etc. 
 Our clinical trial data suggest that mindfulness training significantly decreases 
stress, thought suppression, and alcohol AB. The effects of mindfulness training on stress 
and thought suppression outcomes roughly parallel the pattern observed for trait 
mindfulness. On the contrary, mindfulness training appears to effect alcohol AB for 
alcohol cues presented for 200 ms, while dispositional mindfulness is associated with the 
2000 ms AB. This incongruity deserves further exploration. 
 To resolve this incongruity, the construct of mindfulness must be parsed more 
carefully. Mindfulness is a term that describes a trait, state, and practice (Chambers, 
Gullone, & Allen, 2009). Dispositional mindfulness, as a trait, reflects the tendency 
towards equanimity, a present-centered temporal orientation, awareness of emotional and 
perceptual experience, and taking a nonjudgmental attitude towards one’s own thoughts 
and feelings. The state of mindfulness (which, as it unfolds over time, may actually be 
comprised of numerous stages each with their own distinct phenomenology) is 
characterized by a decentered, non-conceptual attentiveness, wherein thoughts, emotions, 
and sensations are experienced as ephemeral, insubstantial, and not colored by a 
prereflexive sense of ownership or belonging to the self. In metaphorical terms, when 
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immersed in the state of mindfulness, mental experiences become like “clouds passing in 
a clear blue sky” or “waves on the surface of the ocean.”  The practice of mindfulness 
involves anchoring one’s attention onto an object (e.g., the breath, the sensation of one’s 
feet against the ground) from which one can metacognitively monitor moment-by-
moment experience without judgment or reactivity. In so doing, one develops a recursive 
awareness of one’s own background state of consciousness (Chalmers, 2000; Damasio, 
1999); that is, a global mode (e.g., awake, aroused, sleeping, dreaming) that encompasses 
and regulates the contents of consciousness (e.g., specific thoughts, feelings, perceptions, 
or memories).  
 Given the multidimensionality of the construct of mindfulness, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that dispositional mindfulness and mindfulness practice have differing 
relationships to alcohol AB.  We used a self-report measure of trait mindfulness, and 
thus, participants rated their level of mindfulness according to their self-awareness of 
their own qualities.  This measure was inversely correlated with 2000 ms alcohol AB, a 
bias that is thought to index conscious attending to alcohol cues. Both self-reported 
dispositional mindfulness and 2000 ms alcohol AB appear to involve explicit cognition. 
The ability to reflect on one’s own level of mindfulness requires declarative cognitive 
processes such as evaluation, interpretation of semantic meaning, and executive decision 
making. Some of these same processes may have been invoked during the 2000 ms 
participants were exposed alcohol and neutral photographs, at which time they may have 
assessed the personal implications of the images and their overall hedonic value (i.e., 
whether alcohol is perceived as positive and rewarding or negative and destructive). In 
turn, these evaluations may have led to fixation on the alcohol photos or to 
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disengagement from them. More mindful individuals appear to have disengaged more 
readily from alcohol cues presented for 2000 ms than their less mindful counterparts. 
 Conversely, dispositional mindfulness was unrelated to the 200 ms alcohol AB 
measure, a bias thought to index implicit attentional orienting to alcohol cues. This bias is 
considered to be driven by unconscious, automatic cognitive processes that presumably 
are not accessible to self-awareness. If evaluations of trait mindfulness require self-
awareness of one’s own capacities, then it is possible that assessments of this trait might 
be unrelated to implicit processes such as those indexed by the 200 ms alcohol AB task. 
In other words, through self-reflection persons might evaluate themselves as being 
mindful but be unaware of the extent to which they remain affected by implicit appetitive 
responses towards alcohol. 
 In contrast, training in mindfulness meditation exerted significant effects on 200 
ms alcohol AB task performance. The practice of meditation has been shown to impact 
automatic cognitive processes (e.g., Slagter et al., 2007; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005) and may 
lead to durable changes in brain function (Brefczynski-Lewis, Lutz, Schaefer, Levinson, 
& Davidson, 2007; Holzel et al., 2007; Lutz, Brefczynski-Lewis, Johnstone, & Davidson, 
2008; Lutz, Greischar, Rawlings, Ricard, & Davidson, 2004). In turn, meditation-related 
changes in patterns of neural activation may result in neuroplastic alterations to brain 
circuitry instantiating attention, emotion regulation, interoception, and autonomic control 
(Garland & Howard, 2009; Holzel et al., in press; Holzel et al., 2008; Lazar et al., 2005; 
Luders, Toga, Lepore, & Gaser, 2009; Vestergaard-Poulsen et al., 2009). Hence, 
repeated, intentional engagement of mindful states appears to cause changes in attentional 
and neurophysiological processes that may be inaccessible to self-awareness. While 
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biobehavioral changes may result from mindfulness training (e.g., reduction in 200 ms 
alcohol AB and increased parasympathetic recovery from alcohol cues), only the 
downstream effects of such changes (e.g., the sense that one is more equanimous or no 
longer as “captivated by” alcohol cues) may be reportable via self-reflection. Although 
mindfulness training reduced 200 ms AB, it did not appear to increase dispositional 
mindfulness. Thus, after 10 weeks of training, MORE participants exhibited substantial 
changes in implicit attentional operations, while apparently being unaware of changes in 
self-reported mindfulness. 
 Recognizing the potential instability of the 200 ms AB data due to the small 
sample size and unknown reliability of the measure, these interpretations remain 
provisional, at best. Alternatively, the differential effects of dispositional mindfulness and 
mindfulness training may be explained by methodological limitations associated with the 
use of self-report instruments such as the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire to assess 
mindfulness. The limitations inherent in self-report measures of mindfulness may be 
overcome through the use of performance-based, behavioral, and physiological measures, 
such as those employed in this series of investigations. Reconciling first- and third-person 
data remains the task of neurophenomenology (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) and 
scholars dedicated to the study of the effects of mental experiences on biobehavioral 
outcomes. 
 In spite of and perhaps as a result of these unanswered questions, the rough 
outline of a future research agenda is taking shape. Mindfulness training appears to hold 
promise as an intervention for alcohol misuse and dependence, particularly as a form of 
relapse prevention. Full scale clinical trials are needed to establish the efficacy of this 
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promising treatment, as well as to explore the mediators and moderators of the treatment 
effect. Two important research questions deserve further exploration: (a) “How might 
mindfulness training disrupt the cognitive-affective mechanisms of alcohol 
dependence?”; and (b) “For whom is mindfulness training most effective?” In answering 
these questions, important insights into the nature of alcohol dependence and its 
remediation may be gleaned. 
Ultimately, the study of stress, alcohol dependence, and mindfulness illuminates 
the age-old question of determinism. This question was empirically investigated through 
the ingenious work of Benjamin Libet and colleagues, which revealed a readiness 
potential, viz., a cerebral activation several hundred milliseconds prior to the onset of the 
experience of volition that precedes a willed motor act (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 
1983; Libet, Wright, & Gleason, 1982). If acts of will are initiated by unconscious, neural 
impulses, how much more so must compulsive, habitual behaviors (i.e., those observed in 
alcohol dependence) be driven by conditioned circuits in the brain. Yet, if this process 
were inexorable and immutable, the prospect of liberating oneself from grips of addiction 
would be moot.   
The work of Libet, however, also suggests the possibility of freedom from 
automatic and impulsive initiation of action. Libet et al. (1982, 1983) discovered a 
temporal gap between the experience of willing an action and the act itself, and in this 
gap, the individual was able to veto the execution of the action. Thus, in this case, an 
unconscious readiness potential would precede the volition, but would not ultimately 
manifest in motor action. There is, then, the possibility of selecting amongst possible 
courses of action, even if the impulses underlying these actions result from the 
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unconscious and autonomous function of the nervous system. Thus, both the “Yes” and 
“No” to act are presented to consciousness, and it is consciousness that selects amongst 
the options, leading to the eventual execution or inhibition of the action. The process of 
selection is the province of attention: that capacity for certain subsets of information to 
gain preeminence in the competitive processing of neural networks at the expense of 
other subsets of information (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). The selectivity of attention 
allows for the veto, in that the impulse to withhold the action is amplified relative to the 
impulse to act. According to models of attention as biased competition (e.g., Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995), attended stimuli govern behavior; thus, if attention is allocated to the 
inhibitory impulse instead of the addictive urge, processing resources will be biased 
towards impulse control, leading to its primacy in the competition between responses. 
Neurocognitive resources are preferentially allocated to emotional stimuli through 
automatic and selective attentional mechanisms (Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003), potentially 
enhancing the survival of the organism by highlighting the hedonic value of objects, 
events, and beings in the natural world. Although emotional stimuli (such as alcohol or 
the stressors potentially leading to its consumption) are especially salient, having 
privileged access to information-processing resources of the brain, modulatory effects of 
affect may compete with other sources of top-down control (Vuilleumier, 2005). 
Attentional operations such as the metacognitive shifts produced by mindfulness 
meditation are cognitive control processes that can attenuate the influence of affective 
stimuli on biobehavioral responses (Ochsner & Gross, 2005, 2008). Thus, the ability to 
self-regulate cognitive control mechanisms in the midst of emotional distress appears to 
be a key means of willfully reducing negative affect (Posner & Rothbart, 1998). The 
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intentional self-regulation of attention and cognitive appraisal processes resulting in an 
inhibitory veto of affectively-charged neural impulses may be seen as an instance of 
volition, par excellence.  
Mindfulness training, then, may be a means of exercising human volition over 
habitual responding triggered by external stimuli, and is therefore congruent with the 
social work value of self-determination and commitment of the profession to empowering 
vulnerable persons to overcome problematic environmental forces. Thus, mindfulness 
training is a strengths-based intervention focused on the cultivation of personal 
empowerment. As a technique for developing self-regulatory capacity, mindfulness 
training enhances coping and thereby promotes resiliency. Mindfulness-based 
interventions such as MORE may be useful additions to the armamentarium of clinical 
social work, particularly as a treatment for addiction. Given the natural fit between 
mindfulness training and the overarching practice philosophy of the social work 
profession, it could advance practice significantly if a cadre of social work professionals 
were trained in the delivery of this promising intervention. 
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